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ABSTRACT
State and federal employment anti-discrimination statutes have
failed to adequately protect transsexual and transgendered indi-
viduals in the workplace. Although advancements have been made
in recent years regarding the protection of sexual minorities, trans-
sexual and transgendered employees continue to receive sporadic and
noncomprehensive protection. Various approaches have been taken
to extend protection against discrimination to these individuals, in-
cluding the utilization of disability protection statutes, the expansion
of anti-discrimination statutes, and the protection of transsexual and
transgendered individuals as a class; however, these approaches have
proven flawed in providing adequate protection.
An examination of anti-discrimination law shows that these
measures, while perhaps desirable, are not necessary to protect trans-
sexual and transgendered persons. This Article argues that existing
legislation already provides a basis for protecting these minorities.
That is, courts should recognize discrimination against transsexual
and transgendered individuals as classic sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and corresponding state anti-
discrimination statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
Although anti-discrimination laws, on both a federal and state
level, extend protection against discrimination in employment for a
broad range of classifications,1 sexual minorities, including trans-
sexual2 and transgendered 3 individuals, continue to receive only
sporadic and non-comprehensive protection against discrimination
in employment.4 The purpose of this Article is to suggest that the
structure for providing comprehensive protection against employ-
ment discrimination that targets transsexual and transgendered
individuals is already in place and that what is required in order to
realize that protection is for courts to properly apply existing law.5
1. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000);
see also James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-
Duty Behavior, 43 GA. L. REv. 133, 145 n.57 (2008) (discussing state statutes that "'mirror
Title VII and other major federal statutes"').
2. The term "transsexual" is generally used in this Article to refer to individuals
who have sought or are in the process of seeking gender reassignment surgery and other
treatment, including the use of hormones associated with the gender to which they are
seeking reassignment. Many of these individuals have been diagnosed with gender identity
disorder, defined as "a strong and persistent cross-gender identification, which is the
desire to be, or the insistence that one is, of the other sex," coupled with a "persistent
discomfort about one's assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role
of that sex."AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICALMANUALOFMENTAL
DISORDERS 576 (4th ed., text revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
3. The term "transgender" is generally used in this Article to refer to individuals
who fail to conform to the traditional stereotypes and characteristics associated with the
gender that they are assigned at birth, but who may or may not be seeking gender re-
assignment surgery, and who may or may not have been diagnosed with gender identity
disorder. Accordingly, "transgender" is the broader and more inclusive category. See
Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 733 n.12 (2008) (noting that
the term "transgender" is the umbrella and preferred term to describe persons "who ex-
perience discrimination or bias because they identify or express gender differently than
what is traditionally associated with the sex they were assigned at birth"). However, in
describing cases in which a party has described himself or herself as "transsexual" or
"transgender," I have used the term by which that party has self-identified.
4. See Katie Koch & Richard Bales, Transgender Employment Discrimination, 17
UCLAWOMEN'S L.J. 243, 244-45 (2008) (stating that only "[a]bout one-third of the United
States population is covered by transgender-inclusive anti-discrimination laws" and that
both the judiciary and the legislature lack consensus on whether and how to protect the
transgender population from discrimination).
5. I do not mean to suggest that members of the transgender community should not
desire or seek protection against discrimination that addresses their specific situation,
such as through a specific prohibition on gender identity discrimination. I simply suggest
that even in the absence of such a legislative change, courts should extend protection
against such discrimination under the current legal structure. I am aware that reliance
on the present legal structure with respect to sex discrimination to provide protection
to transsexual and transgendered individuals does pose a risk of reinforcing existing
understandings of sex and gender. See Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative
Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEYJ. GENDERL. & JUST.
83, 86 (2008) (discussing an approach for embracing gender variance that does not re-
affirm existing gender norms); Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom:
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A number of different approaches have been attempted to obtain
rights against discrimination in employment for transsexual and
other transgendered individuals. Among these approaches has been
the treatment of transsexual and other transgendered individuals as
persons with a medical condition, so that protection might be sought
under the protection accorded individuals with disabilities;6 this
approach has been unsuccessful at the federal level and has been met
with mixed results in the states.7 Some jurisdictions have sought to
extend protection to transsexual and transgendered individuals by
amending their anti-discrimination statutes to specifically prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender identity or gender expression,
which has been interpreted to protect transsexual and transgendered
individuals as a class;' this approach has been unsuccessful on the
federal level but has occurred in a number of states, although still
a significant minority of the states.9 Another approach, somewhat
more successful in recent years and in some jurisdictions, has been
to seek protection for transsexual and transgendered individuals, not
as a class, but to argue that they are entitled to the same protection
against discrimination - particularly sex discrimination in the form
of sex stereotyping - as is enjoyed by all men and women. °
Still another approach, which has been almost universally unsuc-
cessful, is to argue that transsexual and transgendered individuals,
as a class, should be protected against discrimination on the basis of
sex, that is, that discrimination against transsexual and transgen-
dered individuals is discrimination on the basis of sex."1 The focus of
this Article is on demonstrating that discrimination against trans-
sexual and transgendered individuals - as transsexual and transgen-
dered individuals - is in fact classic sex discrimination and should
A Challenge for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 7 (2003) (discussing the
possibility that successful claims by transsexuals will risk reaffirmation of traditional
views about gender). The purpose of this Article, however, is not to propose a funda-
mental restructuring of how the courts view gender, but instead to demonstrate that
protection for sexual minorities, including transsexual and transgendered individuals,
can be accomplished even without such a fundamental restructuring of conceptions of
sex and gender.
6. See Part I of this Article for a discussion of the medicalization of transsexual and
transgendered individuals and the legal treatment of transsexual and transgendered
individuals under statutes providing protection against discrimination for individuals
with disabilities.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 26-48.
8. See Part II of this Article for a discussion of state and federal attempts to add
gender identity and gender expression as categories protected against discrimination.
9. See infra notes 52-80 and accompanying text.
10. See Part III of this Article for a discussion of attempts - both successful and
unsuccessful - to obtain protection against sex stereotyping for transsexual and
transgendered individuals.
11. See Part IV.
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be recognized as such under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), the federal statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sex, and similar state statutes.12
I. PROTECTION OF TRANSSEXUALISM OR TRANSGENDER STATUS AS A
DISABILITY
In order for a medical condition to constitute a protected disability
under federal and many state laws, the medical condition must gen-
erally be considered an impairment or condition that deviates from
the norm for healthy individuals and must also cause some difficulty
or impairment of what is considered "normal" functioning, often to a
significant degree.' 3 For example, under the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), an "individual with a disability" is defined as
a person with "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits ... [a] major life activit[y] of such individual" or a person
with a record of, or who is regarded as, having such a substantially
limiting impairment.'4 While a "mental disorder" is included within
the definition of a covered impairment," whether the impairment is
considered to be substantially limiting requires a comparison with
the way in which "the average person in the general population" can
perform major life activities, including functions such as "caring for
oneself' and "working."16
The underlying basis for the contention that transsexual and
transgendered individuals have a medical condition that might be
considered a protected disability is the diagnosis of "gender identity
disorder" found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), published by the American Psychiatric
Association.' 7 According to the DSM-IV-TR, a diagnosis of gender
identity disorder requires two necessary components.'8 The first is
"a strong and persistent" identification with the gender with which
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); see also Part IV of this Article for an explanation
of how discrimination against transsexual and transgendered individuals - as transsexual
or transgendered - constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex, already prohibited
by federal and most state anti-discrimination employment statutes.
13. See Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. Prr. L. REv. 597, 610, 628-30 (2004) (discussing
the Americans with Disabilities Act's definition of "disability" and how it compares to
the states' definitions of "disability").
14. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
15. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2007).
16. Id. § 1630.2(i), (j).
17. DSM-V-TR, supra note 2, at 576.
18. Id.
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one is not identified at birth; that is, biological males profess a desire
to be or a claim to be female, while biological females profess a desire
to be or a claim to be male.'9 Among the identified indicators of this
cross-gender identification is a repeatedly stated desire to pass as
the other sex, be the other sex, or live and be treated as the other
sex.2° In children, indicators include a preference for dressing like
the other sex, an intense desire to engage in stereotypical games or
activities of the other sex, and a "strong preference for playmates
of the other sex." 2'
The second component of a diagnosis of gender identity disorder
is a "persistent discomfort" with "or a sense of inappropriateness"
of one's assigned sex or the gender roles of that sex, resulting in a
"clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational,
or other areas of functioning." 22 Among children, this distress is dem-
onstrated by a stated unhappiness with their assigned sex and pre-
occupation with cross-gender wishes, as well as an aversion to their
genitals and secondary sex characteristics.23 Adolescents and adults
demonstrate a "preoccupation with getting rid of primary and second-
ary sex characteristics .. . through hormones, surgery, or other
procedures," and their distress often is seen in isolation, relationship
difficulties, and impaired functioning at school or work.24
A diagnosis of gender identity disorder on the part of a transsex-
ual or transgendered person would presumably constitute a "mental
impairment" under the ADA, as a recognized mental disorder. Simi-
larly, a transsexual or transgendered person meeting the "distress"
or "impairment" requirements of the diagnosis would presumably be
found to be significantly limited in the major life activities of caring for
oneself and working. Accordingly, most transsexual individuals -
who presumably have demonstrated sufficient distress with their
gender identity to seek sex reassignment treatment - would prob-
ably qualify as individuals with a disability under the general defi-
nition of the ADA.25 Similarly, transgendered persons who have not
19. Id. Disorders not fitting this specific criteria may also be diagnosed within the
category of "Gender Identity Disorder Not Otherwise Specified," which can be used for
persons whose gender identity problems are accompanied by a physical congenital
intersex condition, in which individuals are born with physical traits associated with
both sexes. Id. at 582.
20. Id. at 581.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 576.
23. Id. at 581.
24. Id. at 577, 581.
25. Indeed, in a claim brought by a transsexual person under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, before the amendment of that Act to specifically exclude transsexuals from pro-
tection, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Doe v. U.S.
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sought or are not seeking sex reassignment might still be able to dem-
onstrate protected status under the ADA if they could demonstrate
a significant level of distress or impaired functioning as a result of
their gender identity. On the other hand, transgendered persons com-
fortable with their gender identity presumably would not be consid-
ered to be individuals with a disability under the ADA.
It may have been this analysis in part that lead Congress to
specifically exclude transsexual and transgendered individuals from
the definition of individuals with a disability who are provided pro-
tection by the ADA. While the ADA provides that "homosexuality
and bisexuality are not impairments and as such are not disabilities
under this chapter," 2 the Act goes on to exclude other specified con-
ditions from the protection of the ADA, suggesting that without this
express exclusion they might otherwise be protected disabilities.27
Those conditions expressly excluded from the protection of the ADA
include "transsexualism" and "gender identity disorders not result-
ing from physical impairments," along with "other sexual behavior
disorders." 28
The adoption of the amendment providing for this exclusion from
the protection of the ADA appears to have been motivated by an
attempt to appease conservative members of Congress who saw the
ADA as favoring individuals whose "lifestyles" they did not approve
of at the expense of those with religiously-motivated reasons for not
wanting to hire those persons.29 While one might argue for the exclu-
sion of certain conditions from the definition of disability as justified
Postal Service refused to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of disability discrimination, hold-
ing that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that her transsexualism was an emotional
or psychological disorder that substantially limited at least her major life activity of
working. Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 84-3296, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18959, at *7-8
(D.D.C. June 12, 1985). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was amended in 1992 to incorpo-
rate the provisions of the ADA, including the provision excluding transsexuals and indi-
viduals with gender identity disorder from the definition of "individual with a disability."
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102(f), 106 Stat. 4349
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(f) (2006)).
26. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (2000).
27. Id. § 12211(b).
28. Id. § 12211(b)(1). Other conditions excluded from the protection of the ADA in
the laundry list of apparently disfavored "[c]ertain conditions" are "transvestism ....
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism .... compulsive gambling, kleptomania,... pyro-
mania, [and] psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of
drugs." Id. § 12211(b)(1)-(3).
29. The amendment was proposed as the result of a compromise to address the
concerns of senators, including Senator Jesse Helms, about the scope of the definition
of disability under the ADA. Prior to the amendment being proposed, Senator Helms
expressed concern that employers would not be able to exercise their "moral standards"
in making judgments about hiring of certain types of employees. See 135 CONG. REC.
19,863-64, 19,870, 19,884 (Sept. 7, 1989).
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by not wanting to pathologize certain individuals and conditions,3"
this does not appear to have been the motivation of Congress.
At the state level, transsexual and transgendered individuals
have been able to establish the existence of a protected disability
under some state anti-discrimination statutes, but have been unsuc-
cessful in doing so in other states.3' In general, this has depended on
the broadness or narrowness of the definition of protected disabilities
in the different statutes, as well as whether definitive steps have
been taken to specifically exclude them from protection.32
The Superior Court of New Jersey in Enriquez v. West Jersey
Health Systems33 held that gender dysphoria or transsexualism is
a protected disability under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimi-
nation.34 The term "disability" is defined in the statute to include "any
mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from ana-
tomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which
prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is
demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques." 3 The court agreed with the defen-
dants that simply because gender dysphoria is listed in the DSM-
IV-TR does not necessarily make it a protected disability, but the
court did note that its inclusion suggested that it was diagnosable by
"acceptable clinical techniques." 36 The court also noted that the con-
dition of gender dysphoria or transsexualism can be accompanied
by significant distress, including substantial discomfort with one's
"primary and secondary sexual characteristics."37 Accordingly, the
court held that the condition is a disability under the state statute.38
30. For example, portions of the transgender community object to the inclusion of
gender identity disorder in the DSM-IV-TR precisely because of the resulting categori-
zation of gender identity disorder as a mental illness and the resulting stigmatization.
See Patricia Gagnd, Richard Tewksbury & Deanna McGaughey, Coming Out and Crossing
Over: Identity Formation and Proclamation in a Transgender Community, 11 GENDER
& SOC'Y 478, 481 (1997) (describing intense debate within the transgender community,
with some seeking to have gender identity disorder removed from the DSM-IV-TR, while
others argue that diagnosis is only way to obtain access to sex reassignment surgery
and hormones).
31. See Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 375 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) (discussing the holdings of various state courts when answering the question
of whether transsexualism can be considered a disability under state anti-discrimination
statutes).
32. See id. (stating that the court could not find that gender dysphoria is not a dis-
ability because New Jersey's anti-discrimination statute is very broad).
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4
(West 2002).
35. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q).
36. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 374, 376.
37. Id. at 376.
38. Id. The court remanded for a determination ofwhether the plaintiffcould establish
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In contrast, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in Dobre v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.39 held that the plaintiffs transsexualism was not a protected
disability under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).4 °
The PHRA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of an
individual's "non-job related disability.""4 A "[h] andicapped or dis-
abled person" is defined under the statute as one who has "[a] phys-
ical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
major life activities." 42 The court in Dobre held that the plaintiff, a
transsexual woman who alleged that her transsexualism did not in-
terfere with her ability to perform her duties as an Amtrak employee,
did not have a mental impairment as defined in the statute.4" The
court noted in its analysis that a mental impairment was defined
under the PHRA "as 'a mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."'44 Although the
court acknowledged that gender identity disorder is a diagnosable
disorder by the American Psychological Association, the court held
that this fact did not necessarily make it a mental impairment.45 The
court went on to conclude that the meaning of the term "mental im-
pairment" was limited by the terms that gave it meaning - here
"mental illness" and "specific learning disabilities," which the court
said are, "unlike transsexualism,... inherently prone to limit major
life activities.""4 The court concluded that the fact that transsexual-
ism is not prone to have an effect on major life activities suggests
that it was not intended to be included as a protected disability.47 The
court also indicated that because the Pennsylvania statute was mod-
eled on the federal Rehabilitation Act, and because that federal Act
had been "clarified" to exclude transsexual individuals from the defi-
nition of an individual with a disability, transsexualism was also not
intended to be protected under the state statute.48
Future attempts to protect transsexual and transgendered per-
sons under state and federal laws intended to protect the disabled
a claim of disability discrimination under the statute by showing that she, who had
already had sex reassignment surgery, had been properly diagnosed with gender dys-
phoria. Id. at 376-77.
39. Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
40. Id. at 290.
41. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(a) (West Supp. 2007).
42. 16 PA. CODE § 44.4(i) (2008).
43. Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 289.
44. Id. at 288 (quoting 16 PA. CODE § 44.4(ii) (A) (1992)).
45. Id. at 288-89.
46. Id. at 289.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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would be problematic for a number of reasons. In addition to the stig-
matization imposed by categorization of gender identity disorder as
a mental illness, the protection provided by disability discrimination
laws is likely to be incomplete and ineffective for large portions of the
transgender community. Not only has the protection extended to indi-
viduals with disabilities not been as extensive as suggested when the
federal ADA was enacted, 49 but the nature of the protection extended
by these laws is likely to provide protection to only those individuals
who are the most adversely affected by their condition, while not pro-
viding protection from discrimination in employment to those most
comfortable with their condition and therefore most likely to be fully
qualified for the jobs from which they are being excluded.
II. TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED PERSONS AS MEMBERS OF
A PROTECTED CLASS
The exclusion of transsexual and transgendered individuals
from the scope of the protection of the ADA and some state anti-
discrimination statutes has made it necessary to use other methods
to seek protection for transsexual and transgendered persons from
discrimination in employment. The most direct way to accomplish this
would be to expressly extend protection to those groups, either by
amendment of existing anti-discrimination statutes or by the adop-
tion of new statutes providing this protection. In recent years, there
have been legislative attempts - some successful - to expressly in-
clude transsexual and transgendered persons within the protection
of anti-discrimination laws."
At the federal level, the effort to provide protection from discrim-
ination to transsexual and transgendered persons has been recent
and unsuccessful. Although numerous attempts spanning several
decades have been made to include sexual orientation within the
categories protected by the federal anti-discrimination laws,5" only
49. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-101, 103 (1999) (explaining that defendants prevail in
ADA claims at an overwhelmingly high percentage); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 242, 248-49, 250-52
(2001) (recounting the experience of actions brought under the Act and indicating that
defendants, including employers, win the overwhelming majority of cases brought under
the Act).
50. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(p) (West 2005); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 422.56(c) (West Supp. 2008) (defining "gender" to include "gender identity). California's
employment anti-discrimination statute utilizes the penal code's definition of gender.
51. A discussion of these legislative attempts from 1975 to 2007 can be found in
the House of Representative's Report on H.R. 3685, also known as the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 2007. The first committee hearing to be held on a bill to
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recently has legislation been introduced to include gender identity
within the protection of those laws. 52 The most recent attempt to en-
act a prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis
of sexual orientation, in the form of H.R. 3685, the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 2007 (ENDA), passed in the House of
Representatives by a vote of 235 to 184 after being favorably reported
out of House Committee on Education and Labor by a vote of twenty-
seven to twenty-one." Four of the dissenting committee votes on the
bill were explained by those members of Congress as attributable to
the fact that the bill did not also include gender identity within its
protection, as an earlier introduced version of ENDA had.54 Those dis-
senting members of Congress, who had been co-sponsors of the ear-
lier version of ENDA, objected to the fact that the narrower version
of ENDA would not protect transgendered individuals.55 They argued:
While we agree with H.R. 3685's objective of prohibiting work-
place discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, we do not
support the decision to remove gender identity from the bill be-
cause it leaves the legislation woefully incomplete. H.R. 3685 fails
to expressly protect transgender people, who are among the most
at risk for discrimination. The decision to strip gender identity
from the bill was not based on substantive concerns about the
bill's language but rather on the perception that protecting this
vulnerable group might jeopardize the bill's chances for clean
passage on the House floor. We cannot support this rationale,
which reinforces the very bias and discrimination that ENDA
seeks to prohibit.56
The remaining dissenting committee votes on the bill appeared to
be based on an objection to extending federal protection against
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination was in 1994, and in 1996 the first floor vote
on such a bill resulted in its rejection by a vote of fifty to forty-nine in the Senate. H.R.
REP. No. 110-406, pt. 1, at 2-7 (2007).
52. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2007) (including protection for transsexuals).
53. The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on September 27, 2007,
reported out of Committee on October 22, 2007, and passed the House of Representatives
on November 7, 2007. See H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); see also Library of
Congress, Bill Summary, http://thomas.loc.gov (follow "Bills, Resolutions" hyperlink; then
"search Bill Summary and Status"; select 110th Congress; and enter "Employment Non-
Discrimination Act H.R. 3685") (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) (displaying bill information).
54. H.R. REP. No. 110-406, pt. 1, at 44-45 (2007) (discussing the dissenters' reasoning
in voting against ENDA due to their support of an earlier version of the bill).
55. See id. at 44.
56. Id. The Minority Views on H.R. 3685 also indicated that the addition of "gender
identity" to the bill was "politically untenable." Id. at 53 (minority views).
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discrimination in employment to both sexual orientation and gender
identity.57
A proponent of the version of ENDA that did not include gender
identity, Representative Barney Frank, explained his actions in sup-
port of the non-inclusive version of ENDA by noting that while there
was sufficient support in the House to pass - for the first time -
legislation providing protection from discrimination in employment
on the basis of sexual orientation, there was not sufficient support
"to include in that bill explicit protection for people who are trans-
gender." 5 He indicated that the difficult issue was whether to "pass
up the chance to adopt a very good bill because it has one major gap"
and expressed his view that pursuing passage of the non-inclusive
version of ENDA, rather than trying and failing to obtain passage
of the inclusive version, made it more likely that protection would
ultimately be extended to the transgendered.
59
When H.R. 3685 was considered by the House of Representatives,
an amendment to add protection against discrimination on the basis
of gender identity to the bill was offered, discussed, and then with-
drawn without a vote.6" The proponent of the amendment, Repre-
sentative Tammy Baldwin, argued that Congress should follow the
lead of states, cities and towns, and private businesses by protecting
against discrimination based on gender identity;6' she argued that
transgendered individuals should be included in the legislation be-
cause they "share[] a common history with the rest of the lesbian,
gay, and bisexual community." 62 She also argued that no one should
lose a job merely because of a conflict between one's body and "internal
sense of gender." 6' The sponsor of the amendment indicated that she
had taken the approach of withdrawing the amendment without a
vote because, while she believed that there were not enough votes for
adoption of the amendment, she "believe[d] that those who will be
left behind by this bill deserve to hear on this House floor that [they
57. The Minority Views on H.R. 3685 expressed by the minority Republican mem-
bers of the Committee urged the House to "reject any attempt to amend this bill to add
protections for gender identity." Id. at 46.
58. Statement of Barney Frank on ENDA, The Employment Non-Discrimination Act,
http://www.house.gov/frank/ENDASeptember2007.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
59. Id.
60. See 153 CONG. REC. H13,247-48 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Baldwin). That proposed amendment would have protected from discrimination "gender
identity," defined to mean "the gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or
other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the
individual's designated sex at birth." Id. at H13,247.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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have] not [been] forgotten and [Congress's] job will not be finished
until [they] too share fully in the American Dream."64
Numerous supporters of the bill expressed regret that the ver-
sion of the bill being considered did not also provide protection from
discrimination based on gender identity and expressed support for
a proposed amendment that would have added protection for gender
identity to the bill.65 A few comments by opponents of ENDA also
made reference to the issue of gender identity and the amendment
that would add protection for gender identity to the bill.66 Some of
those comments focused on an objection to the fact that the amend-
ment was proposed and then withdrawn without a vote, while other
64. Id. at H13,248.
65. See, e.g., id. at H13,230-31 (statement of Rep. Woolsey) (expressing concern that
the legislation does not protect transgendered people and noting that "[t]ransgendered
people are particularly subject to workplace discrimination, and nearly one-half of all
transgendered people have reported employment discrimination at some point in their
lives"); id. at H13,235 (statement of Rep. Davis) (expressing sorrow that the legislation
being debated did not include gender identity); id. at H13,237 (statement of Rep. Pelosi)
(wishing that gender identity had been included in the bill and noting that she supports
the "passage of ENDA because its passage will build momentum for further advances
on gender identity rights"); id. at H13,238 (statement of Rep. Sanchez) (noting that the
Baldwin amendment, adding protection for gender identity, "is needed because protecting
transgender people is the right thing to do"); id. at H13,238 (statement of Rep. Eshoo)
(indicating "strong support" and intent to continue to advocate for inclusion of "protections
for transgendered Americans in their jobs"); id. (statement of Rep. Langevin) (voicing
"strong support for an amendment" that would add gender identity to protections of
bill); id. at H13,239 (statement of Rep. Stark) (noting that he would have supported the
Baldwin amendment to include gender identity and protection for the transgender com-
munity in the legislation); id. (statement of Rep. Honda) (noting that he was prepared
to vote in favor of the Baldwin amendment, which would have provided protection to
"the most vulnerable, least understood group within the LGBT community, transgender
men and women," and indicating "dedication to further expanding protection to trans-
gender men and women"); id. (statement of Rep. DeGette) (noting that she would support
the proposed bill but "with deep regret the transgendered community has been denied
the protections offered to gays and lesbians in this bill"); id. at H13240 (statement of
Rep. Levin) (indicating that "[tlomorrow we continue to educate and outreach around
the need to also prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity");
id. (statement of Rep. Blumenauer) (noting sadness that gender identity is not included
in the present bill but also noting a "commit[ment] to resolving this inequity in the
future"); id. (statement ofRep. Hirono) (noting support for the Baldwin amendment and
expressing regret "that political realities made it difficult to bring an inclusive ENDA
to the floor today in the first place"); id. at H13,248 (statement of Rep. Maloney) (noting
support for the Baldwin amendment and indicating that "[t]ransgender Americans need
and deserve protection from employment discrimination" and further stating that "[all
too often they bear the brunt of brutal bigotry, and are subject to unspeakable hatred
and violence inspired by fear and ignorance").
66. See, e.g., id. at H13,229 (statement of Rep. McKeon) (opposing H.R. 3685 and
arguing that an amendment including gender identity would be problematic).
67. Id. at H13,228-29 (noting that "[t]here are serious practical and legal concerns with
[the] amendment" to extend protection against discrimination to gender identity and
describing the amendment as "an effort to make an end-run around the legislative process,
considering the full scope of this proposal only when it is convenient for supporters").
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comments seemed to express a substantive objection to providing
protection on the basis of gender identity.68
State legislative efforts to extend protection to transsexual and
transgendered individuals have met with somewhat more success.
A number of states expressly provide that employers may not discrim-
inate in employment on the basis of gender identity. For example, the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act has been amended to
provide that the statute's prohibition against "sex" discrimination
includes discrimination on the basis of gender, including "gender
identity and gender related appearance and behavior whether or not
stereotypically associated with the person's assigned sex at birth." 69
Minnesota, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the
basis of sexual orientation, has defined the term "sexual orientation"
to include "having or being perceived as having a self-image or iden-
tity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or
femaleness." 70 The New Mexico Human Rights Act defines "gender
identity" to mean "a person's self-perception, or perception of that
person by another, of the person's identity as a male or female based
upon the person's appearance, behavior or physical characteristics
that are in accord with or opposed to the person's physical anatomy,
chromosomal sex or sex at birth." 71 Other jurisdictions that expressly
extend protection against discrimination in employment on the basis
of gender identity include Rhode Island,72 Colorado,73 the District of
68. Id. at H13,248 (statement of Rep. Souder) ('This amendment both would protect
transgender in the sense of people who have had sex change operations, and transvestites,
people who dress up as the opposite sex .... I don't really need a right to vote on it. I
think most people probably know where I stand on the issue."). Furthermore, Rep.
Souder stated:
This is the start of a move that many of us who just simply don't approve
of the lifestyle, there are many different things we don't approve of, but
this is a deeply held position of faith by millions of Americans. And this is
an attempt, a start, of what's likely to be an increasing effort to have sexual
liberties trump religious liberties.
Id.
69. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(p) (West 2005); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.56(c)
(West Supp. 2008); supra note 50 (discussing the definition of sex in California's anti-
discrimination statute).
70. MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 (2008).
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2(Q), 7(A) (LexisNexis 2008).
72. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-5-6(10), 7 (2003).
"Gender identity or expression" includes a person's actual or perceived
gender, as well as a person's gender identity, gender-related self image,
gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression; whether or not
that gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related appearance,
or gender-related expression is different from that traditionally associated
with the person's sex at birth.
Id. at § 28-5-6(10).
73. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401(7.5), 402 (2008) (defining "sexual orientation" to
include "transgender status or an employer's perception thereof').
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Columbia,74 Illinois, 5 Iowa,76 Maine," Vermont,78 and Washington.79
The majority of states, however, do not expressly provide protection
against discrimination in employment on the basis of gender identity."
III. TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED PERSONS AS ENTITLED TO
PROTECTION AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION
Even in the absence of legislation expressly extending protection
against discrimination to transsexual or transgendered individuals
as a class, there is still the possibility of extending protection against
sex discrimination to transsexual and transgendered individuals.
That is, just as an African-American transsexual or transgendered
individual is entitled to protection from discrimination based on race
and a Catholic transsexual or transgendered individual is entitled
to protection from discrimination based on religion, transsexual and
transgendered individuals - as men and women - are presumably
entitled to protection from discrimination based on their sex. l
The idea that transsexual and transgendered individuals -
as men and women - are entitled to protection against sex dis-
crimination can be seen most clearly in the context of a hypothetical
74. D.C. CODEANN. §§ 2-1401.02(12A), 1402.11 (LexisNexis 2008) ("Gender identity
or expression" is defined to mean "a gender-related identity, appearance, expression,
or behavior of an individual, regardless of the individual's assigned sex at birth.").
75. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/1-103(0- 1), (Q), 5/2-102 (West Supp. 2008) ("Sexual
orientation" means "gender-related identity, whether or not traditionally associated
with the person's designated sex at birth.").
76. IOWA CODE §§ 216.2(10), 216.6 (2008) ("Gender identity" is defined as "a gender-
related identity of a person, regardless of the person's assigned sex at birth.").
77. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (9-C) (2008) (defining "sexual orientation" to
include "gender identity or expression").
78. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 144 (2007); tit. 21, § 495 (2007) ('The term 'gender
identity' means an individual's actual or perceived gender identity, or gender-related
characteristics intrinsically related to an individual's gender or gender-identity, regard-
less of the individual's assigned sex at birth.").
79. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(15) (LexisNexis 2008) (defining "sexual orien-
tation" to include "gender expression or identity," which is defined as "having or being
perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression,
whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is
different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth").
80. See 153 CONG. REC. H13,247 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Baldwin)
(explaining that only "11 states have laws that include protections based on gender
identity").
81. By making this analogy, I do not mean to suggest that one's status as a transsexual
or transgendered individual is completely distinct from one's sex, as religion and race
are considered to be. Rather, as explained in this section, I contend that gender identity
is in fact an element of sex. However, to the extent that courts view gender identity and
sex as separate categories, a person with a gender identity that does not correspond to
his or her biological sex still has a sex and presumably is entitled to protection against
sex discrimination as a member of that sex.
2009] TRANSFORMING TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 549
employer policy that explicitly favors male transsexual or transgen-
dered individuals over female transsexual or transgendered individ-
uals.12 That is, if an employer refused to hire female transsexual or
transgendered individuals but was willing to hire male transsexual
or transgendered individuals, it would not be difficult for a court to
conclude that sex discrimination was at work.83
A somewhat more controversial claim of sex discrimination made
by transsexual and transgendered individuals is that such persons
are entitled, as men and women, to protection against discrimination
based on sex stereotyping.' The reason that these claims are con-
troversial is because, by definition, a claim of discrimination based
on sex stereotyping seeks to extend protection to gender noncon-
formists, and transsexual and transgendered persons are generally
viewed to be gender nonconformists of the most extreme type. 5 The
82. This Article uses the phrase "male transsexual or transgendered individual" or
"transsexual man" to refer to a person whose gender identity is male, even if he was cate-
gorized as a female at birth. The phrase "female transsexual or transgendered individual"
or "transsexual woman" refers to a person whose gender identity is female, even if she
was categorized as a male at birth.
83. Courts, in rejecting claims of sex discrimination made by transsexual and trans-
gendered individuals - as transsexual and transgendered individuals - have supported
this proposition. For example, in Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reasoned that:
Pursuant to this court's construction, Title VII remedies are equally available
to all individuals for employment discrimination based on race, religion,
sex, or national origin. Indeed, consistent with the determination of this
court, transsexuals claiming discrimination because of their sex, male or
female, would clearly state a cause of action under Title VII.
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977). Similarly, in
James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas refused to dismiss the plaintiffs claim of sex discrimination when the plaintiff,
a transsexual woman, alleged that even though she "a male, working and living as a
female" was terminated, a "female employeef living and working as a male" would not
have been terminated. James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., No. 94-2235-KHV, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19102 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994). See also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742
F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) ("If Eastern [Airlines] had considered Ulane tobe female
and had discriminated against her because she was female (i.e., Eastern treated females
less favorably than males), then the argument might be made that Title VII applied...
but that is not this case.") (citation omitted); Cox v. Denny's, Inc., No. 98-1085-CIV-J-16B,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23333, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999) (holding that even though
transsexuals are not protected from discrimination based on their sexual identity, they
may assert claims of discrimination or harassment if they can establish that the conduct
was based on sex); Dobre v. Nat'l Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(noting that while a transsexual "qua transsexual" cannot maintain a Title VII action,
"'transsexuals claiming discrimination because of their sex ... would clearly state a
cause of action"').
84. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that employment
decision-making based on sex role stereotypes is illegal discrimination under Title VII).
85. It is true, of course, that whether transsexual and transgendered individuals are
viewed as gender nonconformists or gender conformists depends on the sex to which
they are perceived as belonging. For example, to the extent that transsexual women are
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concern is that if these individuals are allowed to assert sex stereo-
typing claims, they will "bootstrap" protection from discrimination
that they are supposed to be denied.' As the Sixth Circuit explained
in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center,7 when rejecting the attempted
viewed as "really men" - because they were categorized as male at birth - then their
identity and presentation as women will be viewed as an extreme form of gender non-
conformity. If they are viewed as "really women," then their identity and presentation
as women will presumably be viewed as gender conformity. However, whether transsexual
and transgendered individuals are subject to discrimination because they are viewed
as gender nonconformists or gender conformists, action taken because of that conformity
or nonconformity constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes.
86. For example, the Second Circuit in Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble expressed
concern over sex stereotyping claims being used to "bootstrap" Title VII protection on
the basis of sexual orientation. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218-19 (2d
Cir. 2005). The court reasoned:
When utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff, however, gender
stereotyping claims can easily present problems for an adjudicator. This is
for the simple reason that "[s]tereotypical notions about how men and
women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about hetero-
sexuality and homosexuality." Like other courts, we have therefore recog-
nized that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used to "bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII."
Id. at 218 (citation omitted). The court's argument seems to be that courts must be
careful about allowing sex stereotyping claims by gays and lesbians, not because those
claims are so different from "proper" gender stereotyping claims, but because they are
so similar. See also Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1065 n.5 (7th
Cir. 2003) ("Ve recognize that distinguishing between failure to adhere to sex stereotypes
(a sexual stereotyping claim permissible under Title VII) and discrimination based on
sexual orientation (a claim not covered by Title VII) may be difficult. This is especially true
in cases in which a perception of homosexuality itself may result from an impression of
nonconformance with sexual stereotypes."). Judge Posner's concurring opinion in Hamm
also expresses some concern about the recognition of sex stereotyping claims, in part
because of the difficulty that courts may have in distinguishing sex stereotyping claims
from claims of sexual orientation discrimination:
Hostility to effeminate men and to homosexual men, or to masculine women
and to lesbians, will often be indistinguishable as a practical matter, espe-
cially the former. Effeminate men often are disliked by other men because
they are suspected of being homosexual (though the opposite is also true -
effeminate homosexual men may be disliked by heterosexual men because
they are effeminate rather than because they are homosexual), while man-
nish women are disliked by some men because they are suspected of being
lesbians and by other men merely because they are not attractive to those
men; a further complication is that men are more hostile to male homosexual-
ity than they are to lesbianism. To suppose courts capable of disentangling
the motives for disliking the nonstereotypical man or woman is a fantasy.
Id. at 1067 (Posner, J., concurring). Interestingly, Judge Posner's conclusion about the
difficulty of distinguishing between sex stereotyping and discrimination based on sexual
orientation leads him to a suspicion of sex stereotyping claims, rather than to a con-
clusion that sexual orientation claims might be recognized as a form of sex stereotyping
claim. This is particularly interesting in light of his apparent recognition that discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation appears to have a gendered component, in the
sense that men are more hostile toward male homosexuality than female homosexuality.
87. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
2009] TRANSFORMING TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 551
sex stereotyping claim of a man perceived as homosexual by his co-
workers:
Ultimately, recognition of Vickers' claim would have the
effect of de facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual orien-
tation as a prohibited basis for discrimination. In all likelihood,
any discrimination based on sexual orientation would be action-
able under a sex stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to
stand, as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to tradi-
tional gender norms in their sexual practices.
88
That is, the court seems to reason, gay men and lesbians must be pre-
vented from making claims of sex stereotyping because, otherwise,
they would be able to successfully show that they have been discrimi-
nated against based on their gender nonconforming behavior, that
is, precisely because they fail to comply with sex stereotypes.8 9
But the lower courts' suspicion of sex stereotyping claims seems
unwarranted in light of the Supreme Court's support of this line of
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has long held that employment
decisions based on stereotypes about protected groups violate Title VII
and the other federal anti-discrimination statutes. 9° In City of Los
Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,91 the Court noted
that employers were prohibited under Title VII from basing employ-
ment decisions on stereotypes, whether those stereotypes had a factual
basis or not.92 The Court noted that "[ilt is now well recognized that
employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' im-
pressions about the characteristics of males or females." 93 Similarly,
the Court in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,94 a case decided under the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, indicated that the
reliance on stereotypes about protected groups to disfavor members
of those groups was the "essence" of disparate treatment; 95 the Court
explained that "[i]t is the very essence of age discrimination for an
older employee to be fired because the employer believes that pro-
ductivity and competence decline with old age." 96 Indeed, the Court
88. Id. at 759, 764.
89. See id. An analysis of whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
like discrimination on the basis of gender identity, is also properly a form of sex discrimi-
nation is beyond the scope of this Article.
90. See, e.g., Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (stating that sex
stereotypes violate the Family and Medical Leave Act); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (discussing illegal stereotypes under Title VII).
91. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
92. See id. at 709.
93. Id.
94. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
95. See id. at 609.
96. Id. at 610.
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indicated that the very enactment of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act was motivated by Congress's "concern that older
workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of inaccu-
rate and stigmatizing stereotypes.""9 The Court's language not only
recognizes the role of stereotypes in prohibited discrimination but
seems almost to suggest that, without reliance on those stereotypes,
the statute might not be violated.9"
The Supreme Court case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins99 dem-
onstrates that employers are not only barred from making employ-
ment decisions based on stereotyped assumptions about members
of protected groups, but that employers are also prohibited from re-
quiring that employees comply with sex and gender stereotypes in
order to secure employment opportunities. " In the context of a woman
denied promotion to partnership in an accounting firm because she
was considered "macho" and overly aggressive, 1' a plurality of the
Court noted that the employer had engaged in unlawful sex stereo-
typing: "In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."10 2 The plu-
rality went on to make clear the illegality of reliance on sex stereo-
types in making employment decisions by noting:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group, for "'[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against indi-
viduals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women result-
ing from sex stereotypes.' 1
03
97. Id.
98. See id. at 611 (noting that "[w]hen the employer's decision is wholly motivated
by factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes
disappears").
99. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating
that employers may not require employees to "match[] the stereotype associated with
their group").
100. See id. at 251.
101. Id. at 235-37.
102. Id. at 250.
103. Id. at 251 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978)
(quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))). The
plurality did note that the mere existence of comments showing sex stereotyping does
not prove the existence of discrimination, but that the employee must show that gender
played a role in the challenged decision and that those comments can constitute evi-
dence that gender played such a role. Id.; see also id. at 272-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(discussing the role that gender stereotypes play in establishing the existence of an intent
to discriminate on the basis of sex). Even the dissenting Justices in Price Waterhouse
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Reliance on sex and gender stereotypes would appear to be an
inherent part of the treatment given to transsexual and transgen-
dered individuals in the workplace. Indeed, both the medical and
legal definitions of transsexual and transgendered individuals appear
to rely heavily on sex and gender stereotypes. The diagnostic criteria
for gender identity disorder contained in the DSM-IV-TR include, for
boys, a "preference for cross-dressing or simulating female attire"
and for girls, an "insistence on wearing only stereotypical masculine
clothing," as well as an "intense desire to participate in the stereo-
typical games and pastimes of the other sex."104 The legal definitions
of gender identity also incorporate the stereotypical notion that cer-
tain standards of appearance or behavior are associated with men and
women when they reference "gender-related identity, appearance,
or mannerisms," 105 or make clear that protection exists "whether or
not that gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related
appearance, or gender-related expression is different from that tradi-
tionally associated with the person's sex at birth."106
seemed to recognize that reliance on sex stereotypes in making employment decisions
would violate Title VII. They noted that while 'Title VII creates no independent cause
of action for sex stereotyping," "[e]vidence of use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes
is, of course, quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent." Id. at 294 (Rehnquist,
Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). They went on to explain that the ultimate question
was whether the discrimination caused harm to the plaintiff, seeming to equate sex
stereotyping with discrimination as long as causation was established. See id.
104. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 581. The description of the diagnostic features of
gender identity disorder is rife with gender stereotypes, apparently making clear dis-
tinctions between what are considered "normal" male and female activities. For example,
it is noted that boys "may have a preference for dressing in girls' or women's clothes"
and may "particularly enjoy playing house, drawing pictures of beautiful girls and prin-
cesses and watching television or videos of their favorite female characters." Id. at 576.
It is noted that boys may play with Barbie dolls and "avoid rough-and-tumble play and
competitive sports and have little interest in cars and trucks and other nonaggressive
but stereotypical boys' toys." Id. Girls, on the other hand, may have "negative reactions
to... attempts to have them wear dresses or other feminine attire," instead "prefer[ring]
boys' clothing and short hair." Id. at 576-77. Girls may "show little interest in dolls or
any form of feminine dress-up or role-play activity," preferring Batman and Spiderman
and "contact sports, rough-and-tumble play, and traditional boyhood games." Id. at 577.
Adults are said to "adopt the behavior, dress, and mannerisms of the other sex" and
have "an intense desire to adopt the social role of the other sex." Id.; see also DSM-IV-TR
CASEBOOK: A LEARNING COMPANION TO THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 363-65 (Robert L. Spitzer et al. eds., 4th ed. 1994) (noting that there
should be little question of diagnosis of gender identity disorder for an eight-year-old boy
who plays with dolls instead of "toy cars, trucks, or trains," and who "enjoys playing with
kitchen toys," playing in the role of a female, and "drawing female figures").
105. See the definition of "gender identity" in a proposed amendment to H.R. 3685.
Amendment to H.R. 3685, As Reported, Offered by Ms. Baldwin of Wisconsin, http://
www.rules.house.gov/110/amendments/hr3685_baldwin.pdf (last visited Mar. 18,2009).
106. See the definition of "gender identity and expression" in Rhode Island's anti-
discrimination in employment statute. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(10) (2003).
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A number of courts have recently concluded that transsexual and
transgendered individuals can indeed assert claims under Title VII
for discrimination based on their gender nonconforming behavior or
appearance or failure to comply with sex stereotypes held by their
employers. 07 These cases do not generally hold that transsexual and
transgendered persons as such are entitled to protection, only that
they are entitled to the same protection that other men and women
have against being disadvantaged for engaging in gender noncon-
forming behavior or failing to comply with sex stereotypes. 08
One of the first cases to recognize such a claim was Smith v.
City of Salem.° 9 The plaintiff, a lieutenant with the fire department,
was a pre-operative transsexual woman who had been diagnosed
with gender identity disorder.110 After her diagnosis, she began to
"express[] a more feminine appearance," prompting comments from
her co-workers that her "appearance and mannerisms were not 'mas-
culine enough.""" In response, the plaintiff informed her supervisor
of her diagnosis and that her "treatment would eventually include
complete physical transformation from male to female.""1 2 In spite
of the plaintiffs request to her supervisor not to divulge her condition
to superiors at the fire department, the supervisor did so, resulting
in a series of actions taken in order to bring about her termination,
including repeated requirements that she undergo psychological eval-
uations and a suspension."' The plaintiffs claim of sex discrimination
under Title VII was dismissed by the district court on the pleadings." 4
107. See infra notes 110-53 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). Similarly, an earlier district
court case within the Sixth Circuit refused to dismiss a female transsexual plaintiffs
Title VII claim, holding that the plaintiff could bring a sex stereotyping claim based on
her contention that the employer fired her because of her appearance, even if the plaintiff
could not assert a claim of sex discrimination based on her transsexualism. Doe v. United
Consumer Fin. Serv., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25509, at *8-13 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 9, 2001) (indicating that while it was conceivable that the plaintiff was fired
simply because of her transsexualism, it was also conceivable that she was fired at least
in part because "her appearance and behavior did not meet [the employer's] gender
expectations"). Another case from the same court seemed to recognize the possibility
that the female transsexual plaintiff could have stated a claim for sex stereotyping in
spite of her transsexualism, but held that the evidence did not support such a claim be-
cause the employer "only required Plaintiff to conform to the accepted principles estab-
lished for gender-distinct public restrooms." Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
2d 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
110. The court indicated that Smith was "biologically and by birth a male" and used the
male pronoun to refer to the plaintiff. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568. The plaintiff's first name
is listed in the case as "Jimmie." Id. at 566. It is not clear from the decision whether this
represented a feminization of her "male" name or whether this was her name from birth.
111. Id. at 568.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 568-69.
114. Id. at 569.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court, holding that the plaintiff had "suf-
ficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimi-
nation" by alleging that the defendant's actions were based on her
"failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should
look and behave."'15 The court of appeals indicated that the district
court had erred in relying on a succession of pre-Price Waterhouse
cases to conclude that a transsexual person could not make out a
claim of sex discrimination under Title VII." 6 The court noted that
those earlier cases had refused to recognize sex stereotyping claims
because of their conclusion that the discrimination that had occurred
had been on the basis of "'gender' rather than 'sex,"' but that the
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse had established that Title VII
prohibits both discrimination based on "sex" - discrimination based
on biological differences between men and women - and discrimi-
nation based on "gender" - discrimination based on failure to con-
form to stereotypical gender norms.'17 The court reasoned that dis-
crimination against men for engaging in gender nonconformity in
their behavior and dress was just as unlawful under Title VII as dis-
crimination against women for engaging in gender nonconforming
behavior."'
The court expressly rejected the conclusions of other courts that
discrimination against transsexual persons is different in kind from
discrimination based on sex stereotyping and that the gender noncon-
forming conduct of the plaintiff was not subject to protection simply
because of the plaintiffs generally unprotected status as a transsexual
person.' 9 The court reasoned:
115. Id. at 572.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 572-73.
118. The court reasoned:
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women
because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in
sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the
victim's sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against men because
they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also
engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur
but for the victim's sex.
Id. at 574.
119. The court described the analysis of those other courts in the following terms:
Yet some courts have held that this latter form of discrimination is of a
different and somehow more permissible kind. For instance, the man who
acts in ways typically associated with women is not described as engaging
in the same activity as a woman who acts in ways typically associated with
women, but is instead described as engaging in the different activity of being
a transsexual (or in some instances, a homosexual or transvestite). Dis-
crimination against the transsexual is then found not to be discrimination
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Such analyses cannot be reconciled with Price Waterhouse, which
does not make Title VII protection against sex stereotyping con-
ditional or provide any reason to exclude Title VII coverage for
non sex-stereotypical behavior simply because the person is a
transsexual. As such, discrimination against a plaintiff who is a
transsexual - and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his
or her gender - is no different from the discrimination directed
against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical
terms, did not act like a woman. Sex stereotyping based on a per-
son's gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimi-
nation, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as
"transsexual," is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the
victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender
non-conformity. 120
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the plaintiff had stated a
claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.12'
A completely different panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati122 also concluded that a transsexual
person could state a claim for sex stereotyping under Title VII, up-
holding a substantial jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, a pre-
operative transsexual woman who lived as a male while on duty but
as a female off duty. 2 The plaintiff in that case had been condition-
ally promoted to the position of a sergeant with the police depart-
ment, but failed her probationary period when she was subjected to
extensive supervision and training not required of other probationary
employees. 24 Among the comments made to the plaintiff was that
she did not seem masculine enough and needed to stop wearing make-
up in order to be promoted. 2 ' The Barnes court followed the reason-
ing of the court of appeals in Smith to conclude that the plaintiff, as
a transsexual individual, was not precluded from asserting a claim
of sex stereotyping. l2 The court indicated that the plaintiff could
bring this claim because she was a member of a protected class under
"because of... sex," but rather, discrimination against the plaintiffs un-
protected status or mode of self-identification. In other words, these courts
superimpose classifications such as "transsexual" on a plaintiff, and then
legitimize discrimination based on the plaintiffs gender non-conformity by
formalizing the non-conformity into an ostensibly unprotected classification.
Id.
120. Id. at 574-75.
121. Id. at 575.
122. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
123. Id. at 733-35. The court of appeals noted that the plaintiffs name had been Phillip
and was now Philecia and used the male pronoun to refer to the plaintiff. Id. at 733.
124. Id. at 733-34.
125. Id. at 735.
126. Id. at 737.
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Title VII - "whether as a man or a woman." 12' The court also spe-
cifically held that a Title VII sex discrimination claim could be based
on a claim of discrimination based on sex stereotypes. 2 '
Other courts have also concluded that transsexual and transgen-
dered individuals are allowed to assert claims that they were discrim-
inated against based on sex under Title VII when they were penalized
for engaging in gender nonconforming behavior. 129 In Lopez v. River
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc.,"' the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the plaintiff, a
transsexual woman diagnosed with gender identity disorder, had
stated a legally viable claim for sex discrimination when she alleged
that she was not hired based on her failure to comply with traditional
male stereotypes."' Rejecting the conclusions of other courts that
the gender nonconformity of transgendered individuals was different
in kind from that protected by rules against sex stereotyping, the
court indicated that the plaintiffs transsexualism did not bar her
sex stereotyping claim." 2 The court reasoned:
The Court cannot ignore the plain language of Title VII and
Price Waterhouse, which do not make any distinction between a
transgendered litigant who fails to conform to traditional gender
stereotypes and an "effeminate" male or "macho" female who,
while not necessarily believing himself or herself to be of the oppo-
site gender, nonetheless is perceived by others to be in noncon-
formity with traditional gender stereotypes. There is nothing in
existing case law setting a point at which a man becomes too
127. Id. at 737-39.
128. Id. at 741.
129. See, e.g., Creed v. Family Express Corp., 101 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 609,611-
12 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that a transsexual woman could state a claim that she was
terminated for failure to comply with sex stereotypes, when she alleged that she was
told to appear more masculine during business hours); Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp.
2d 58, 60, 63 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that the transsexualism of the plaintiff, a pre-
operative transsexual woman applying for the position of terrorism research analyst
with the Library of Congress, did not act as "a bar to her sex stereotyping claim"); Mitchell
v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. 05-243, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6521, at *2-5 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 17, 2006) (holding that a pre-operative transsexual woman who alleged that she had
been harassed and terminated because of her gender nonconforming behavior had
stated a claim under Title VII). The court in Mitchell noted that while some courts have
refused to extend protection to transsexuals under this theory, "neither the Court nor
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has set forth this distinction." Id.
130. Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653 (S.D.
Tex. 2008).
131. Id. at 655-56, 660-61. The court referred to the plaintiff, who the court indicated
was biologically male but lived as a woman, as Izza Lopez, noting that her legal name
was Raul Lopez, Jr., and used the female pronoun to refer to her. Id. at 655.
132. Id. at 659-60.
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effeminate, or a woman becomes too masculine, to warrant pro-
tection under Title VII and Price Waterhouse.'33
Instead, the court held that Title VII is violated whenever an employer
discriminates against an employee for failing to act "sufficiently mas-
culine or feminine," whether or not that employee is a transsexual
individual. 3 1
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
Schroer v. Billington135 also held that a transsexual individual was
not precluded from making a claim of sex discrimination based on
sex stereotyping, even though the court initially concluded in a prior
memorandum order that discrimination against transsexual persons
is different in kind from discrimination based on sex stereotyping. 1
36
The court noted that the plaintiff, a pre-operative transsexual woman
applying for the position of terrorism research analyst with the
Library of Congress,'37 had alleged sex discrimination under two
different theories - one claiming that she had been discriminated
against based on sex stereotypes and one alleging that discrimina-
tion against transsexual persons is itself sex discrimination.13 The
court, in its first opinion considering the employer's motion to dis-
miss, held that the plaintiff had not stated facts to support a claim
for sex stereotyping. 39 The court indicated that the purpose of Price
Waterhouse was to "create[] space for people of both sexes to express
their sexual identity in nonconforming ways" but that the plaintiff
in this case did "not wish to go against the gender grain, but with
it."'4 0 Accordingly, the court held that "[p]rotection against sex stereo-
typing is different, not in degree, but in kind, from protecting men,
whether effeminate or not, who seek to present themselves as women,
or women, whether masculine or not, who present themselves as
men."141 The court indicated that a transsexual individual might be
able to state a sex stereotyping claim if he or she alleged discrimi-
nation for failure to appear masculine or feminine enough based on
the employee's appearance or conduct, but held that the plaintiff had
133. Id. at 660.
134. Id.
135. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
136. Schroer v. Bilington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 (D.D.C. 2006) (mem).
137. Id. at 205. The court noted that the plaintiff was classified as a male at birth and
christened David John Schroer, but that she had changed her name to Diane Schroer
and began living full-time as a woman. The court used the female pronoun to refer to
the plaintiff. Id.
138. See id. at 207.
139. Id. at 211.
140. Id. at 210-11.
141. Id. at 210.
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not made such a claim, and instead alleged that she had been dis-
criminated against because of her gender identity and intent to pre-
sent herself as a woman.142 The court denied the employer's motion
to dismiss, however, because of the possibility that the plaintiff could
show that discrimination against transsexual persons - as trans-
sexuals - was literally discrimination based on sex.143
On consideration of a second motion to dismiss filed by the em-
ployer, the district court in Schroer held that the plaintiff, who had
amended her complaint, now stated a claim for sex discrimination
based on sex stereotyping. 144 The court indicated that the plaintiffs
complaint now alleged that she had not been selected for the position
in part because of the employer's reaction to seeing photographs of
the plaintiff in female clothing - that the employer thought that the
plaintiff looked "'like a man in women's clothing rather than what
she believed a woman should look like."'"14 The court went on to con-
clude that this allegation stated a claim for sex stereotyping because
she was essentially alleging that she was discriminated against be-
cause, when presenting as a woman, she did not conform to the em-
ployer's stereotypical notions of what a woman should look like.146
The court indicated that an allegation by a female transsexual that she
did not appear feminine enough would state a claim under Title VII, 14
although, as suggested in the court's prior memorandum order, an
allegation by a transsexual woman that she did not appear masculine
enough would not state such a claim. 148 Because the court concluded
that the plaintiff now stated a claim for sex stereotyping, the court
indicated that it did not have to decide whether she could also state
a claim under her theory that discrimination against transsexuals
was prohibited sex discrimination.149
In its decision after trial on the merits, the district court in
Schroer held that the plaintiff did establish that she had been
142. Id. at 211.
143. Id. at 211-13. For a discussion of this portion of the court's opinion, see infra text
accompanying notes 219-27.
144. Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2007) (mem.).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 63.
147. Id. at 62-63. The court restated its prior contention that protection against sex
stereotyping is different in kind, rather than degree, from protecting transsexuals as
transsexuals. Id. at 63. Furthermore, the court said that the plaintiffs gender dysphoria
was relevant to her claim of sex discrimination because she would not make out such
a claim if her only contention was that she was not selected for the position because of
disclosing her gender dysphoria or her intent to present herself as a woman. Id.
148. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210-11 (D.D.C. 2006) (mem.).
149. Schroer, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63. This portion of the court's opinion is discussed
at text accompanying infra notes 228-35.
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discriminated against on the basis of sex stereotyping. 150 The court
concluded that the plaintiff had presented direct evidence that the
Library of Congress's hiring decision was based on sex stereotypes,
based in part on the testimony of the decisionmaker that the plain-
tiff looked like "a man in women's clothing" in the photographs of
the plaintiff in traditionally female attire.'5 ' The court also relied
on the decisionmaker's conversations with her co-workers to the effect
that she had particular difficulty understanding the plaintiffs deci-
sion to become a woman because of the plaintiffs background in the
Special Forces and therefore status "as a particularly masculine kind
of man." '52 The district court concluded that the plaintiff had estab-
lished the existence of discrimination based on sex under her sex
stereotyping theory regardless of whether she was viewed as "an in-
sufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or an
inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual." 151
Other courts, however, have argued that transsexual and trans-
gendered persons should not be able to make out claims of sex stereo-
typing under Title VII because of the fundamental differences between
the type of sex stereotyping prohibited by Price Waterhouse and the
objections that employers express concerning transsexual and trans-
gendered employees and job applicants.'54 For example, in Etsitty v.
Utah Transit Authority,'55 the United States District Court for the
150. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300 (D.D.C. 2008).
151. Id. at 305.
152. Id.
153. Id. The district court did note that the plaintiffs sex stereotyping claim was
"difficult" because "direct evidence of discrimination based on sex stereotypes may look
a great deal like discrimination based on transsexuality itself, a characteristic that, in and
of itself, nearly all federal courts have said is unprotected by Title VII." Id. However,
unlike other courts that have concluded that this similarity between the claims was
grounds for refusing to recognize sex stereotyping claims when brought by transsexual
and transgendered individuals, the Schroer court found this similarity to be grounds for
recognizing that discrimination against transsexuals was in fact sex discrimination. The
portion of the court's opinion finding that the plaintiff had established a claim of sex-
based discrimination on the basis of transsexualism is discussed at text accompanying
infra notes 236-47.
154. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634,
at *13-15 (D. Utah June 24, 2005), affd, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Oiler v. Winn-
Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *26, 30 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,
2002).
155. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *1. The court of appeals affirmed the
decision of the district court to grant summary judgment for the employer without decid-
ing the question of whether transsexuals can state claims for sex stereotyping. Instead
the court assumed that such a claim was available, but that the plaintiff had not estab-
lished that claim because the employer's asserted concern about the plaintiff using
women's bathrooms while she retained male genitalia was a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the plaintiffs termination, which had not been shown to be pretextual. Etsitty,
502 F.3d at 1224-27.
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District of Utah rejected on summary judgment the plaintiffs claim
that she had been fired for failing to comply with gender stereo-
types." 6 The plaintiff in that case was a pre-operative transsexual
woman who was hired as a transit operator while presenting as a
man, but was fired after she disclosed that she was transsexual and
would begin to present as a woman at work."' The employer justified
its decision to terminate her employment on the grounds that it was
concerned about her using women's restrooms while she retained
male genitalia and marked her termination record as "eligible for
rehire after completion of 'his surgery (transformation)."'1 58
The district court in Etsitty expressly rejected the analysis of
the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem'59 that discrimination
against a transsexual person for gender nonconforming behavior is
not different from the discrimination faced by the plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse who was penalized for not acting enough like a stereo-
typical woman. 6 ° The Etsitty court held that "there is a huge differ-
ence between a woman who does not behave as femininely as her
employer thinks she should, and a man who is attempting to change
his sex and appearance to be a woman."' 6 ' In arguing that the "drastic
action" of changing one's sex should not be "characterized as a mere
failure to conform to stereotypes," the court cited to the DSM-IV-TR
for authority that gender identity disorder should not be confused
with "simple nonconformity to stereotypical sex role behavior."'6 2
The district court went on to justify its conclusion by noting that
the logical extension of the Smith court's reasoning would be the
"complete rejection of sex-related conventions," a result not contem-
plated by Congress or the Court in Price Waterhouse.'63 The court rea-
soned that if transsexuals could not be penalized for dressing as a
member of the opposite sex, then the same rules would apply to non-
transsexuals." Accordingly, the court said, if protection against sex
stereotyping were extended to transsexuals, "then any male employee
could dress as a woman, appear and act as a woman, and use the
156. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *16-19.
157. Id. at *1-5.
158. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff had changed her name from Michael Etsitty
to Krystal Sandoval Etsitty and was taking female hormones, but retained her male
genitalia. The court described the plaintiff as follows: "From the time she was a small
child, she has always felt that she is female, despite being born with a male body." The
court used the female pronoun to refer to the plaintiff. Id. at *1-2.
159. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
160. Etsitty, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12634, at *11-12.
161. Id. at *12.
162. Id. at *12-13.
163. Id. at *15.
164. Id. at *14.
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women's restrooms, showers and locker rooms, and any attempt by
the employer to prohibit such behavior would constitute sex stereo-
typing in violation of Title VII."''
It is not clear at all, however, that the Etsitty court's parade of
horribles is a conceivable result of the recognition of sex stereotyp-
ing claims by transsexuals, much less a likely one. The jurisdictions
that have recognized such claims do not appear to have faced a rash
of claims by non-transsexual men trying to dress "like women" or to
use women's shower facilities. In addition, the fact that "the medi-
cal community does not equate transsexualism with a mere failure
to conform to stereotypes"166 - and therefore does not diagnose all
persons who engage in gender nonconforming behavior as having gen-
der identity disorder - does not answer the legal issue of whether
an employer's negative reaction to a transsexual person's gender non-
conformity is legally equivalent to an employer's negative reaction to
a non-transsexual person's gender nonconformity. That is, the ques-
tion is not whether the two situations are medically the same, but
whether individuals will be precluded from asserting their right to
be free from the need to conform to sex stereotypes merely because
they are transsexual or transgendered and therefore their gender
nonconformity is more profound.
Analysis similar to that of the district court in Etsitty is found
in the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. 167 The
plaintiff in that case indicated that he was not transsexual but trans-
gendered, having been diagnosed with "transvestic fetishism with
gender dysphoria"; the court called him a "male crossdresser."'
6 8
The plaintiff was discharged after he disclosed to his supervisor that
he was transgendered and asked whether he would be fired if the
company's president ever saw him crossdressed as a woman.6 9 The
decision was then made to terminate his employment on the grounds
that customers, if they recognized the plaintiff as a crossdresser while
working, would disapprove of his lifestyle and shop elsewhere. 7 °
The district court rejected the plaintiffs claim that he had been
discharged based on unlawful sex stereotyping.' 7 ' The court held that
the discrimination against the plaintiff was fundamentally different
165. Id. at *14-15.
166. Id. at*13.
167. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3144,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La.
Sept. 16, 2002).
168. Id. at *4.
169. Id. at *7-9.
170. Id. at *9-10.
171. Id. at *28.
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than that involved in sex stereotyping: "[t]his is not just a matter of
an employee of one sex exhibiting characteristics associated with the
opposite sex. This is a matter of a person of one sex assuming the role
of a person of the opposite sex." '72 In rejecting the plaintiffs conten-
tion that he had been disparately treated compared to women who
dressed in a masculine manner, the court noted that those women
were differently situated from the plaintiff:
There is no evidence in the record establishing that any
woman who worked for the defendant was a crossdresser, i.e., a
woman who adorned herself as a man in order to impersonate a
man and who used a man's name. While there were women work-
ing for the defendant who wore jeans, plaid shirts, and work shoes
while working in the warehouse or in refrigerated compartments,
there is no evidence that they were transgendered or that they
were crossdressers, i.e., that they impersonated men and adopted
masculine personas or that they had gender identity disorders.' 3
It is difficult to understand the court's attempt to distinguish
the female employees of the employer who wore stereotypically mas-
culine clothes - and it is difficult to imagine more stereotypically
masculine clothes than jeans, plaid shirts, and work boots - from
the plaintiff, who wore stereotypically female clothes; the court de-
scribed him as wearing "women's clothing, shoes, underwear, breast
prostheses, wigs, make-up, and nail polish." 174 The only distinctions
appear to be that the plaintiff was transgendered and the women
were not, and that the plaintiff was a man and the women were
women. Accordingly, what the court may be saying is that while non-
transgendered individuals are entitled to wear clothing associated
with the other gender, transgendered persons are not. Alternatively,
the court may be saying that while women are allowed to dress in ste-
reotypically male clothing, men who dress in stereotypically female
clothing are not protected from discrimination. Either conclusion
would send a troublesome message about the protections of Title VII.
The first message seems to indicate that only the non-transgendered
are allowed to be gender nonconformists - that is, that the transgen-
dered are denied the protections against sex discrimination avail-
able to all other persons. And it would be difficult to conclude that
the second message was unrelated to "sex." Men who wear dresses
are "crossdressers," while women who wear men's plaid shirts and
work boots apparently are not. Instead, the distinction apparently
172. Id. at *30.
173. Id. at *36.
174. Id. at *28.
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being drawn by the court - and perhaps by society - about the
different level of acceptance of men and women engaging in gender
nonconforming behavior and dress appears to be classic discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex or gender.
IV. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED
PERSONS AS PROHIBITED SEX DISCRIMINATION
The apparently different standards applied to men and women
who engage in gender nonconforming behavior suggest that our
societal standards concerning the line between mere gender non-
conformity and the extreme gender nonconformity demonstrated by
transsexual and transgendered persons is itself gendered. That is,
the reasons that members of society, including members of the work-
force, react negatively to transsexual and transgendered individuals
may be precisely related to sex or gender. There are a number of
reasons for believing that this is true.
As suggested by the court's analysis in the Oiler case, society
appears to be more tolerant of gender nonconformity of women than
men.'75 Even as children, "tomboys" - young girls who act "like
boys" - are more accepted than "sissies" - young boys who are
considered too effeminate. 176 Societal standards of acceptable dress
among children and adults also reflect this uneven approval of gen-
der nonconformity between the sexes. Women can wear what would
have once been considered "masculine" clothing - pants, suits, and
even ties - without any sanction; indeed, professional women are
generally expected to dress in a manner that de-emphasizes their
secondary sex characteristics.'77 Men, on the other hand, are gener-
ally ridiculed for dressing in a way that is considered traditionally
feminine. A man in a dress instantly stands out;178 only relatively
175. See id. at *36.
176. See Milton Diamond, Biased-Interaction Theory of Psychosexual Development:
"How Does One Know if One is Male or Female?", 55 SEX ROLES 589, 595 (2006)
(indicating that "a male that exhibits feminine behaviors sufficient to be considered a
sissy is much less tolerated than a female tomboy").
177. Even in the case of Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating Co., in which the court of
appeals upheld a dress code requirement that women, but not men, wear facial makeup,
the dress code imposed on both male and female bartenders required that they wear the
same "uniform of black pants, white shirt, black vest, and black bow tie," and com-
fortable black shoes. Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1105-07 (9th
Cir. 2006). What the court characterized as a "unisex" dress code unmistakably imposed
a traditionally male style of dress. See id. at 1112; see also Michael Selmi, The Many
Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 467, 470 (2007) (noting the
irony that while female bartenders were required to wear makeup, the uniform that
female - and male - bartenders were required to wear was "very male in appearance").
178. Indeed, in the case of Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., a biological male
seeking to apply for a bank loan, who was wearing "traditionally female attire," was sent
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recently have men been able to wear earrings or makeup or carry a
purse - a "man bag" - without social disapproval. It is not enough
to dismiss these differences as just a matter of social norms; it cannot
be an accident that "masculine" dress is acceptable for women, but
"feminine" dress is not acceptable for men. Instead, it appears that
society is willing to accept a woman who strives to emulate men,
while looking with disapproval on a man who demeans himself by
"aping" women.179
Society's greater disapproval of gender nonconformity among
men also appears to extend to the gender nonconformity evidenced
by transsexual and transgendered individuals. Evidence suggests
that men in general object to transsexualism more than women do;"
this may be particularly true with respect to transsexual women.''
Men who view women as inferior may well find it especially repug-
nant that transsexual women intentionally and willingly give up the
societal advantages that are provided to men by becoming women.
Men, even those who do not hold negative views of women, may find
it incomprehensible that transsexual women are willing and even
eager to give up their penises.' 82 And some men may also feel that
home and told to dress in a more gender-appropriate manner if he wanted to receive a
loan application. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 2000).
It is one thing to expect employees to conform to societal gender norms in their dress;
employers are used to telling employees what to do. It is much more startling for a service
business to seek to impose its standards of appropriate dress on customers, showing the
strength of the objection to a man in a dress, given that it was strong enough to overcome
the "customer is always right" tendency.
179. For example, a higher degree of fashion is associated in our society with women's
dress, while male dress is considered more somber. This difference is not just a differ-
ence, but reflects negatively on women, because "[diress is viewed, negatively, as a super-
ficial, female concern." See Julie A. Seaman, The Peahen's Tale, or Dressing Our Parts
at Work, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 423, 441 n.96, 462 & n.210 (2007). As is often the
case, traits associated with women tend to be undervalued and viewed negatively, while
traits associated with men tend to be highly valued and viewed positively. See Cecilia L.
Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Unpacking the Gender System: A Theoretical Perspective
on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations, 18 GENDER & SOC'Y 510, 513, 522-23 (2004).
180. See Mikael Landrn & Sune Innala, Attitudes Toward Transsexualism in a
Swedish National Survey, 29 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAv. 375, 375, 378, 381-85, 387
(2000) (noting that in a survey of 992 Swedish citizens, men were found to have more
restrictive views of transsexualism than women, which was consistent with prior
research findings).
181. The reactions of men and women to other gender nonconforming behavior, such
as same-sex sexual conduct, also appears to be gendered. Cf. Jeni Loftus, America's
Liberalization in Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 1973 to 1998, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 762,
780 (2001) (reporting that research indicates that "men report more positive attitudes
toward lesbians than they do toward gay men, while women report slightly more negative
attitudes toward lesbians than they do gay men").
182. The second of these two views maybe reflected in the opinion of a male appellate
court judge considering the claim of a transsexual woman that she had been discriminated
against not just as a transsexual but as a woman. The judge noted:
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transsexual men are merely "passing" as men and therefore seeking
a status and privileges to which they are not entitled; sometimes these
feelings are expressed in the form of sex-based violence and rape.1 s3
Similarly, some women may view transsexual women as inter-
lopers and not true women and transsexual men as traitors.8 4 The
first of these views appears to be reflected in a letter written by a
mother responding to her son's disclosure of her transsexualism:
It is insulting to me, as a woman, that you assume that the outer
trappings of femaleness somehow entitle you to all the other
baggage that women carry - baggage that can only be acquired
by growing up female in a male world. For you to think that don-
ning female attire entitles you to appropriate and fully under-
stand all that being a woman encompasses is unfair to me and
to women in general. It denigrates my experience. The way you
appear to grasp all this is so male.8 '
Ulane is entitled to any personal belief about her sexual identity she desires.
After the surgery, hormones, appearance changes, and a new Illinois birth
certificate and FAA pilot's certificate, it may be that society, as the trial
judge found, considers Ulane to be female. But even if one believes that a
woman can be so easily created from what remains of a man, that does not
decide this case.
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984). The reference to "what
remains of a man" would appear to be a reference to the removal of the plaintiffs penis
and other external sex organs.
183. In the film "Boys Don't Cry," Brandon Teena, the main character, a transsexual
or transgendered male, was beaten, raped, and then murdered by the men with whom
he had been socializing and drinking - as a man - after they discovered that he was, in
fact, biologically a woman. Their anger - as portrayed in the film - appeared to be based
at least in part on their embarrassment for having been "taken in"; their actions of com-
mitting rape appeared to be a result of a desire to "put her in her place." See BOYS DON'T
CRY (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2000). This film was based on the real life rape and mur-
der of Brandon Teena in Humboldt, Nebraska in 1993. See Dallas Denny, Transgender
Communities of the United States in the Late Twentieth Century, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS 183 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang & Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006).
Brandon Teena's mother brought a civil lawsuit against Richardson County, Nebraska
and Sheriff Charles B. Laux for negligence, wrongful death, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress concerning actions surrounding the rape and murder. Brandon v.
County Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 604, 610-11 (Neb. 2000).
184. See Shannon Price Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting
Real about Transgender Inclusion, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 183, at 141, 155
(recounting the views of "lesbian feminist theorists" who "demonized transsexual women
as the epitome of misogynist attempts to invade women's space and appropriate women's
identity"); Kirkland, supra note 5, at 3 (recounting the hostility that some feminists
hold toward transsexuals, viewing transsexual women just as "men who had mutilated
themselves and because of their still-remaining male psyche and upbringing" should be
excluded from feminism "since they continue to exhibit traits of their male dominance"
and transsexual men as women who have "discarded their womanhood to join the
patriarchy").
185. See MILDRED L. BROWN & CHLOE ANN RoUNSLEY, TRUE SELVES: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSSEXUALISM - FOR FAMILIES, COWORKERS, AND HELPING PROFESSIONALS 175-76
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It is difficult to understand these reactions as other than gen-
dered or motivated by issues of sex and the proper role and status
of the sexes. Many of these reactions are clearly based on gender
hostility, such as the mother's characterization of her son's behavior
as "so male" and the fact that the hostility of men who discover the
transsexualism of a drinking buddy is expressed by rape. And even
these reactions that are not based purely on hostility do appear to be
motivated by beliefs about sex and gender. Accordingly, it appears
that negative views about transsexual and transgendered individuals
are related to gender and therefore are motivated, at least in part,
because of sex.
If discrimination against transsexual and transgendered individu-
als is even partially motivated by gender or sex, then discrimination
against transsexual and transgendered persons should appropriately
be considered discrimination on the basis of sex, as sex would have
been "a motivating factor" for the challenged employment practice,
"even though other factors also motivated the practice."186 However,
courts have almost uniformly resisted this conclusion.
Before the recent trend by some courts to allow transsexual and
transgendered individuals to assert claims of sex discrimination
under a sex stereotyping theory, courts traditionally held that trans-
sexual and transgendered persons simply were not entitled to the
protection of Title VII, on the grounds that the congressional prohi-
bition against sex discrimination was not intended to extend protec-
tion to those individuals.8 7 Courts expressed this conclusion in a
number of ways. For example, a number of courts concluded that the
plain meaning of "sex" in Title VII does not include change of sex,188
but instead only referred to biological sex.189 Some went further to
(1996) (setting forth a letter written by a mother to son who disclosed her transsexualism
and intent to become a woman).
186. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
187. See, e.g., Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (E.D. Pa.
1993) ("Simply stated, Congress did not intend Title VII to protect transsexuals from
discrimination on the basis of their transsexualism.").
188. See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[Flor
the purposes of Title VII the plain meaning must be ascribed to the term 'sex' in absence
of clear congressional intent to do otherwise."); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566
F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Giving the statute its plain meaning, this court concludes
that Congress had only the traditional notions of'sex' in mind."); Grossman v. Bernards
Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16261, at *8-10 (D. N.J. Sept. 10,
1975), affrd w/o opinion, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976) ("In the absence of any legislative
history indicating a congressional intent to include transsexuals within the language
of Title VII, the Court is reluctant to ascribe any import to the term 'sex' other than its
plain meaning."); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977) ("A reading
of the statute to cover plaintiffs grievance would be impermissibly contrived and incon-
sistent with the plain meaning of the words.").
189. Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 84-3296, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18959, at *4-5
(D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
567
568 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:535
explain that Title VII was intended "to ensure that men and women
are treated equally""19 and to "prohibit conduct which, had the vic-
tim been a member of the opposite sex, would not have otherwise
occurred,"' 91 apparently concluding that either a transsexual man
or a transsexual woman would have faced the same treatment by
the employer.' 92
In concluding that the plain language of Title VII indicates that
transsexual persons were not entitled to the protection of the statute,
the district court in Dobre v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.'93
drew a distinction between the term "sex" and the term "gender."
The court explained that "[tlhe term 'sex' in Title VII refers to an in-
dividual's distinguishing biological or anatomical characteristics,
whereas the term 'gender' refers to an individual's sexual identity."1
94
The court apparently concluded that the term "sex" does not include
"gender," noting that Title VII meant only that an employer could
not discriminate against a woman because she was a woman (or,
presumably, a man because he was a man).195
Attempts by courts to exclude transsexual and transgendered
individuals from the protection of Title VII by defining the term "sex"'
not to include "gender" are clearly inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent interpreting Title VII, in particular its decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'96 The plurality in that case seemed to draw
no distinction between sex and gender, seeming to use the terms inter-
changeably. 197 Even more clearly, the plurality equated "gender" and
[I]n the absence of legislative history suggesting that Congress intended
the word "sex" to mean anything other than the biological male or female
sexes, we agree with the court in Ulane, that a "prohibition against discrim-
ination based on an individual's sex is not synonymous with a prohibition
against discrimination based on an individual's sexual identity disorder or
discontent with the sex into which they are born."
Id.
190. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
191. Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456,457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd
w/o opinion, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
192. See id. (stating that discrimination based on being a transsexual does not fall under
Title VII).
193. Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Coxv. Denny's, Inc., No. 98-1085-CIV-J-16B, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23333, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999) ("Title VII protects against discrimination or harass-
ment of males because they are male and females because they are female.").
196. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
197. For an example of the Court's interchangeable use of"sex' and "gender," compare
id. at 237 (stating "even if a plaintiff shows that her gender played a part in an em-
ployment decision") (emphasis added), with id. at 239 ("Congress made the simple but
momentous announcement that sex... [is] not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees.").
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"sex" with the following reference to the language of the statute:
"Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in
making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute." 198
After quoting the statutory language prohibiting discrimination
"'because of such individual's... sex,"' the plurality went on to say
that "[w]e take these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant
to employment decisions." 199 Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence,
also used the term "gender" to refer to the protections of Title VII.200
Even the dissent seems to have equated the two words, using them
interchangeably.2"' That the use of the term was not an accident is
made obvious by the fact that the Court clearly extended protection
to Ann Hopkins based on her gender nonconforming behavior, a trait
not defined by her biological sex but by social expectations of the way
women should act.20 2
198. Id. at 239.
199. Id. at 240.
200. See id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Tihe burden of persuasion should shift
to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision concerning Ann Hopkins' candidacy absent consideration of
her gender.").
201. See id. at 284-85 (Rehnquist, Scalia & Kennedy, J.J., dissenting) ("That sex may
be the legitimate cause of an employment decision where gender is a BFOQ is consistent
with the opposite command that a decision caused by sex in any other case justifies the
imposition of Title VII liability."). A later case demonstrates that any attempt to draw
a clear legal distinction between the meaning of the terms "sex"e and "gender" has gar-
nered the support of only a minority of the justices. In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the majority
of the Court held that use of peremptory challenges for jurors on the basis of gender
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. J.E.B. v. Alabama,
511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994). Justice Scalia's dissent, joined only by Justice Thomas and
then Chief Justice Rehnquist, sought to draw a distinction between the meaning of "sex"
and the meaning of "gender" in the following way:
Throughout this opinion, I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination
rather than (as the Court does) gender discrimination. The word "gender"
has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal char-
acteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes.
That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to
male. The present case does not involve peremptory strikes exercised on
the basis of femininity or masculinity (as far as it appears, effeminate men
did not survive the prosecution's peremptories). The case involves, therefore,
sex discrimination plain and simple.
Id. at 157 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is not clear at all, however, that Justice Scalia was
correct in his assertion that the discrimination in that case was based on physical rather
than "attitudinal" characteristics, given that men in that case were apparently subject
to challenge, not because they had penises, but because it was assumed that they would
be more sympathetic to the male litigant who was a defendant in a paternity and child
support action. Id. at 137-38 (majority opinion). Indeed, the majority in that case ex-
pressly rejected the attempt of the state to rely on gender-based stereotypes to justify its
gender-based challenges: "We shall not accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory
challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns."' Id. at 138.
202. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 ("As for the legal relevance of sex stereo-
typing, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming
570 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:535
At least one court has concluded that the Supreme Court's
equating of the terms "sex" and "gender" means that transsexual
persons - as persons "who do not conform to socially-prescribed gen-
der expectations" - have been subjected to gender, and therefore,
sex discrimination.2"3 In Schwenk v. Hartford,2" 4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered a female trans-
sexual inmate's claim that a sexual assault by a male prison guard
violated the Gender Motivated Violence Act,20 5 which was a part of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.206 In interpreting the Act's
requirement that the violence be motivated by gender, the court
looked to Title VII law, including Price Waterhouse, as evidence of
the meaning of the term "gender." 207 The court concluded that under
both statutes, the terms "sex' and "gender" are interchangeable and
that discrimination on both grounds is prohibited. 20 ' Accordingly,
the court said, "[d]iscrimination because one fails to act in the way
expected of a man or a woman is forbidden under Title VII." 209 In
concluding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence that
the sexual assault had occurred because of gender, the court relied
on evidence that the guard was aware that the plaintiff considered
herself transsexual and a female and that the actions of the guard
were motivated at least in part by her gender, which the court indi-
cated in this case was "her assumption of a feminine rather than a
typically masculine appearance or demeanor."21 Accordingly, the
court seems to have concluded that the prohibition on actions based
on gender include action based on one's transsexualism.211
However, even courts that have found that transsexual and
transgendered individuals can state claims under Title VII under a
sex stereotyping theory have generally held that a sex discrimination
or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group ...."); see
also id. at 272 (equating consideration of failure to conform to gender stereotypes as
"discriminatory input into the decisional process").
203. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 n.12 (9th Cir. 2000).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1194; 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000). The Supreme Court in United States v.
Morrison later held that Congress did not have the authority to enact this provision.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000).
206. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)).
207. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1200-02.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. The court concluded that the conduct of the prison guard was covered by
the Act, despite the guard's contention that "it was not clearly established at the time
of the attack that gender motivation and animus encompassed acts motivated by a
victim's transsexualism." See id. at 1204-05. The court responded to the guard's argument
by stating that the Act clearly covered "'all persons in the United States,"' including
transsexuals. Id. at 1205.
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claim cannot be made based on a claim of discrimination for being
transsexual or transgendered. For example, the district court in
Creed v. Family Express Corp.212 rejected the assertion of the plain-
tiff that the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse had
"eviscerated" the prior court holdings that had concluded that trans-
sexuals were not protected against discrimination by Title VII.213
The Creed court concluded that while transsexuals can state a claim
of sex stereotyping if their assertion that they were discriminated
against for a failure to act or appear masculine or feminine enough
arose from their appearance or conduct, they could not establish a
claim of sex discrimination based on discrimination against trans-
sexuals as transsexuals.214
A few courts, however, have concluded - some only tempo-
rarily - that discrimination on the basis of transsexualism is a
form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. In a portion of
the opinion later withdrawn, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem,21 5 after concluding that
the female transsexual plaintiff could make out a claim of sex ste-
reotyping, also indicated that an allegation of discrimination based
on "self-identification as a transsexual - as opposed to his specific
appearance and behavior" would also state a claim under Title VII.
216
The court reasoned:
By definition, transsexuals are individuals who fail to conform
to stereotypes about how those assigned a particular sex at birth
should act, dress, and self-identify. Ergo, identification as a trans-
sexual is the statement or admission that one wishes to be the
opposite sex or does not relate to one's birth sex. Such an admis-
sion - for instance the admission by a man that he self-identifies
as a woman and/or that he wishes to be a woman - itself violates
the prevalent sex stereotype that a man should perceive himself
as a man. Discrimination based on transsexualism is rooted in the
insistence that sex (organs) and gender (social classification of a
person as belonging to one sex or the other) coincide. This is the
very essence of sex stereotyping.
217
In the new opinion issued after this one was withdrawn, this para-
graph was simply deleted, as was another sentence indicating that
212. Creed v. Family Express Corp., 101 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 609 (N.D. Ind.
2007).
213. See id. at 610.
214. Id. at 611.
215. Smith v. City of Salem, 369 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2004), withdrawn, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15574 (6th Cir. July 28, 2004).
216. Id. at 921.
217. Id. at 921-22.
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the court found the plaintiffs claim of discrimination "because of his
identification as a transsexual" to be actionable under Title VII.218
Accordingly, the court of appeals ultimately did not decide the ques-
tion of whether discrimination against a transsexual person, as a
transsexual, constituted discrimination on the basis of sex in viola-
tion of Title VII.
Another set of three opinions involves a court first suggesting -
but not quite holding - that transsexual individuals as transsexuals
are protected by Title VII, then backing away from that suggestion,
before ultimately concluding that discrimination against transsex-
ual individuals as transsexuals is prohibited sex discrimination. In
Schroer v. Billington,"' on consideration of the employer's initial
motion to dismiss, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held open the possibility that the plaintiff, a transsexual
woman who had been denied a position as a terrorism research ana-
lyst with the Congressional Research Service, might be able to state
a claim of sex discrimination based on discrimination because of her
transsexualism.22 ° Courts holding that discrimination based on trans-
sexualism is not protected by Title VII have often relied on the deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,221 which concluded that transsexuals
are not protected under Title VII, rejecting the district court's deci-
sion to the contrary.222 The district court in Schroer suggested that it
might be time to revisit the decision of the district court in Ulane223
"that discrimination against transsexuals because they are transsexuals
is 'literally' discrimination 'because of... sex." 224 The Schroer court
cited to intervening changes in what "sex" under Title VII means,
changing jurisprudence on the meaning of legislative history, and a
need for a better understanding of the science of gender identity.225
The Schroer court reasoned that this "straightforward way" of deal-
ing with transsexualism was appropriate in light of "the factual
complexities that underlie human sexual identity," including "real
variations in how the different components of biological sexuality -
chromosomal, gonadal, hormonal, and neurological - interact with
218. Compare id. at 918, 921-22, with Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 571, 575 (6th
Cir. 2004).
219. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006) (mem.).
220. Id. at 212-13.
221. See, e.g., Dobre v. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284,286-87 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984)).
222. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
223. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212-13.
224. Id. at 212 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc. 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
225. Id.
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each other, and in turn, with social, psychological, and legal concep-
tions of gender." 2 6 The court indicated, however, that this decision
could not be made on the pleadings, citing the need for a factual record
to be compiled that reflected the scientific basis of sexual identity and
gender dysphoria.227
On consideration of the employer's new motion to dismiss, after
a factual record had been compiled as to the scientific basis of gender
identity, the district court in Schroer once again considered the issue
of whether discrimination against transsexual individuals because
they are transsexual constituted discrimination based on sex. 228 The
court again declined to decide this issue, this time because the court
concluded that the plaintiff already survived the employer's motion
to dismiss because she had adeqtately made out a claim of sex dis-
crimination based on sex stereotyping.229 The court did note that the
testimony of the defendant's expert - to the effect that sex was medi-
cally determined solely by chromosomes - could not be controlling
on the legal meaning of "sex" because, as a legal matter, sex clearly
refers to more than chromosomes, including social expectations of
gender-related behavior.23 ° However, the court also cast doubt on
whether discrimination on the basis of transsexualism should be
recognized as sex discrimination as a legal matter, based on recent
legislative action in Congress concerning gender identity.231 The court
noted that legislation was originally introduced that would have
prohibited discrimination both on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity, but that the legislation passed by the House of
Representatives addressed only sexual orientation.232 The court
reasoned:
If Title VII itself bans discrimination on the basis of sexual or
gender identity, the omission of protection for transsexuals in
H.R. 3685 may be meaningless, but, even in an age when legisla-
tive history has been dramatically devalued as a tool for statutory
interpretation, one proceeds with caution when even one house
of Congress has deliberated on a problem and, mirabile dictu,
negotiated a compromise solution.233
226. Id.
227. Id. at 213.
228. Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58, 61 (D.D.C. 2007).
229. Id. at 63.
230. See id. at 61-63 (noting that the testimony of the expert offered by the plaintiff
indicated "that a person's sex is a multifaceted concept that incorporates a number of
factors, including sex assigned at birth, hormonal sex, internal and external morphological
sex, hypothalamic sex, and gender identity").
231. Id. at 63-64.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 64. The legislative history referred to by the district court related to the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, which is not an amendment to Title VII,
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While this recent legislative history might provide some evidence
of the meaning that Congress presently gives to the word "sex" in
Title VII, it is difficult to give serious weight to a 2008 legislative
compromise in providing content to a term included in different leg-
islation forty-four years earlier. In addition, as the district court in
Schroer recognized in its earlier decision, the unanimous Supreme
Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.234 pronounced
that "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed."235 Accordingly, if the term "sex" in Title VII in-
cludes factors other than biological sex, such as gender identity, then
the particular intent of the 1964 or 2008 Congress to provide protec-
tion against discrimination to transsexual and transgendered indi-
viduals should not be controlling.
The district court in Schroer, in its most recent opinion finding
for the plaintiff after trial on the merits,236 also concluded that this
recent legislative action was not controlling on the question of the
meaning of "sex" as it relates to transsexual and transgendered in-
dividuals.237 The district court noted the hazard of relying on sub-
sequent "legislative non-history" to give content to the intent of an
earlier Congress and indicated that another reasonable interpreta-
tion of Congress's action was "that some Members of Congress believe
that the Ulane court and others have interpreted 'sex' in an unduly
narrow manner, that Title VII means what it says, and that the stat-
ute requires, not amendment, but only correct interpretation."2 3
The district court concluded that the Library of Congress's de-
cision not to hire the plaintiff because of her "decision to transition,
legally, culturally, and physically, from male to female" constituted
discrimination on the basis of sex.239 The court noted the existence of
expert testimony to the effect that the relevant scientific community
but, if enacted, would be a separate statute. See supra Part II for a discussion of that
proposed legislation and the issue of gender identity. The term "mirabile dictu," not
previously known by this author, is defined in the WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 864
(1991) as "strange to say; marvelous to relate." THE ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(North American ed., 2009), available at http://encarta.msn.com (search "mirabile dictu"
within the dictionary link) (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) defines "mirabile dictu" as an
"expression of wonder: used to introduce the announcement of something the speaker,
genuinely or ironically, considers to be amazing."
234. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
235. Id. at 79.
236. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
237. See id. at 308.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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recognized gender identity to be one of several components of sex,24°
but also noted that there was conflicting evidence presented. 241 The
court indicated that resolving the dispute about the proper scientific
definition of sex was not within the competence of the court but also
was unnecessary.242 Instead, the court relied on the legal definition
of "sex" gleaned from the plain language of the statute.243 The court
noted that the evidence established that the Library of Congress re-
voked the offer of employment "when it learned that a man named
David intended to become.., a woman named Diane" and that this
was discrimination because of sex.244 In concluding that discrimina-
tion based on change of sex equates to sex discrimination, the court
drew an analogy to religion, demonstrating that discrimination based
on a change of religion would constitute unlawful religious discrimi-
nation.2 45 The court also noted that discrimination on the basis of
race had not been defined narrowly to include only "discrimination
for being one race or another." 2 46 Finally, the court concluded that
even if "sex" was defined narrowly to include only biological sex, the
Library of Congress's decision not to hire her because she intended
"to change her anatomical sex by undergoing sex reassignment sur-
gery was literally discrimination 'because of. . . sex."' 
2 47
Before the recent district court decision in Schroer, the decision
that had concluded most definitely that discrimination against trans-
sexual and transgendered persons should be considered sex discrim-
ination under Title VII was that of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois in Ulane,245 a decision, as indi-
cated previously, that was later reversed by the Seventh Circuit.249
240. Id. at 306 & n.7. (noting the testimony of Dr. Walter Bockting, Associate Professor
at the University of Minnesota Medical School specializing in gender identity disorders,
that the "nine factors that constitute a person's sex" are gender identity, "chromosomal
sex, hypothalamic sex, fetal hormonal sex, pubertal hormonal sex, sex of assignment
and rearing, internal morphological sex, external morphological sex, and gonads").
241. Id. at 306 (noting the conflicting testimony of Dr. Chester Schmidt, Professor of
Psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine that gender identity is
"a component of 'sexuality' rather than 'sex,"' in that components of sex have "a deter-
mined biologic etiology," which gender identity does not).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 306-07 (indicating that other courts have allowed their focus on the issue
of transsexualism to "blind them to the statutory language itself" and that the reasoning
of courts that Title VII prohibits only discrimination against men because they are men
and discrimination against women because they are women "represent[s] an elevation
of 'judge-supposed legislative intent over clear statutory text"') (quoting Zuni Pub. Sch.
Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 307 n.8.
247. Id. at 308.
248. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. 11 1983).
249. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).
575
576 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:535
The Ulane case involved a transsexual woman who was fired as a
pilot after she had sex reassignment surgery and sought to return to
work.25 ° In considering the motion to dismiss filed by the employer
on the grounds that Title VII did not reach the plaintiffs claim, the
district court acknowledged that Congress did not specifically con-
sider the question of whether transsexuals should be covered by the
statute at the time Title VII was enacted, but did not find that fact
to be controlling.25' Instead, the district court relied on the "literal
language" of the statute and the fact that Congress had not acted
to exclude transsexuals from the term "sex," as well as the fact that
cases decided since the enactment of Title VII had broadened what
might have originally been meant by the term "sex."252 The court
indicated that it was not free "to disregard that plain language."253
The court reasoned:
I do not see how it can be said here, assuming for purposes
of the motion the truth of the allegations of the complaint, that
plaintiff was not fired because of her sex. It seemed to me the
plaintiff made a telling argument in her brief when she suggested
that the firing was, in effect, a statement that a condition of plain-
tiffs continued employment was that she remain a male. And if
that suggestion is valid, then clearly the allegations of the com-
plaint show that the discharge was because of sex....
What does seem to me apparent is that there is no way out
of the conclusion that whatever the physiology may be it has
[something] to do with sex, as that term is commonly under-
stood. And what I meant when I said earlier that the statute
must be given both a literal and a broad interpretation is that
the discharge need only have some causal connection to a sexual
consideration in order to be prohibited by the statute.254
The court's analysis, rendered some time before the Supreme Court's
decision in Price Waterhouse and the subsequent amendment of
250. For a description of the facts of the case, see the district court's consideration of
the parties' motions for summary judgment, Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., No. 81 C 4411,
1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17407, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 1983).
251. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., No. 81 C 4411, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13049, at *2-3
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1982).
252. Id. at *2.
253. Id.
254. Id. at *3-4. The transcript of the court's ruling on the motion to dismiss actually
uses the word "nothing" in the bracketed portion of the quotation. However, in the tran-
script of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on the merits of the case, the
district court judge indicated that the statement as quoted was the exact opposite of
what he intended to say. He asked that the word "something" be substituted for the word
"nothing," so that he did "not go down in posterity as someone who cannot articulate a
reason for a decision." Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 838-39 (N.D. IlM. 1984).
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Title VII by § 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,256 appears to have
accurately predicted both the broadening of the meaning of the term
"sex" that occurred in the Court decision and the fact that an employ-
ment practice will be found to be unlawful sex discrimination even
if it is motivated in part by sex and in part by other considerations.
In a later opinion denying the parties' motions for summary
judgment, the district court in Ulane reiterated its prior conclusion
that the plaintiff had made out a claim of sex discrimination, noting
its previous order to the effect that Title VII is violated by firing an
employee for having a sex change operation.256 The court also re-
jected several of the justifications provided by the employer in its
letter terminating the plaintiffs employment as insufficient to rebut
the plaintiffs prima facie case of sex discrimination, including the
contention that the plaintiff had severed the employment relation-
ship by an operation changing her into a different person than the
one that the employer had hired.257 The court indicated that the
assertion that the "plaintiff is no longer qualified because she was
male when she applied for the job but is no[w] female, goes right to
the heart of Title VII's prohibition of sexual discrimination.""2 '
The final reported decision of the Ulane district court was its
order, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, after trial
of the case. On the issue of whether discrimination against trans-
sexuals was prohibited by Title VII, the court addressed the mean-
ing of the word "sex," after apparently hearing substantial medical
and scientific evidence about the nature of gender identity and its
relationship to the determination of an individual's sex:
I find by the greater weight of the evidence that sex is not a
cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes, and that while there may
be some argument about the matter in the medical community,
the evidence in this record satisfies me that the term, "sex," as
used in any scientific sense and as used in the statute can be and
should be reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations
the question of sexual identity and that, therefore, transsexuals
are protected by Title VII.259
255. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(a), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(amended § 703(m) of Title VII, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000)) (providing that
"an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demon-
strates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice").
256. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., No. 81 C 4411, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17407, at *5 &
n.2 (N.D. Il. Apr. 26, 1983).
257. Id. at *4-5.
258. Id. at *5.
259. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825.
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The court acknowledged that Congress had not thought about the
issue of whether the word "sex" includes transsexuals, but that the
court was required to interpret the language used by Congress.26 ° The
court held that the most reasonable way to interpret the word "sex"
was to conclude that the word "literally applies to transsexuals and
that it applies scientifically to transsexuals," based on the factual
record developed in the case.26'
Although the district court in Ulane found the literal language
of Title VII and the failure of Congress to specifically address the
issue of whether Title VII protected transsexual persons to support
its interpretation of the statute, the court of appeals in Ulane relied
on the same factors to reach the opposite conclusion.262 The court of
appeals found the plain language of the statute to mean that it is un-
lawful to discriminate against women because they are women and
men because they are men, but that the term "sex" did not reach
"discrimination based on an individual's sexual identity disorder or
discontent with the sex into which they were born."26' The court
found the lack of legislative history on the meaning of the word "sex"
to strongly reinforce this interpretation.264
The court of appeals indicated that a person with a sexual iden-
tity disorder was "a person born with a male body who believes him-
self to be female, or a person born with a female body who believes
herself to be male." 26 The court of appeals would seem to have been
describing someone who, in the reasoning of the district court, had
a different sexual identity than his or her chromosomal sex, both of
which the district court thought, based on the medical and scientific
evidence, were components of the determination of "sex." '66 But the
court of appeals seemed almost dismissive of the efforts of the district
court to educate itself about transsexualism before deciding whether
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
263. Id.
264. Id. The court of appeals said that the lack of legislative history indicates that
Congress had only the traditional concept of sex in mind because "[h]ad Congress in-
tended more, surely the legislative history would have at least mentioned its intended
broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals, and would no doubt have
sparked an interesting debate. There is not the slightest suggestion in the legislative
record to support an all-encompassing interpretation." Id. But, of course, the district
court judge had conceded that Congress had not specifically considered the application
of the statute to transsexuals, and the court of appeals failed to mention that there was
"not the slightest suggestion in the legislative record" that would give any hint of the
meaning of the term "sex." See id.
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
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discrimination on that basis was motivated, at least in part, by sex.
The court of appeals indicated that:
We do not believe that the interpretation of the word "sex" as
used in the statute is a mere matter of expert medical testimony
or the credibility of witnesses produced in court. Congress may,
at some future time, have some interest in testimony of that type,
but it does not control our interpretation of Title VII based on the
legislative history or lack thereof.2" '
However, if the legislative history of Title VII is silent on the
issue of whether transsexual and transgendered individuals were
intended to be protected by the prohibition of sex discrimination -
as it certainly is - and if the Supreme Court dictates that "it is ulti-
mately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns
of our legislators by which we are governed," 26 - as the Court has
said - then all we have to go on to determine whether transsexual
and transgendered persons are protected by Title VII is the meaning
of the term "sex." The often-asserted position that the word "sex"
means simply biological sex is no longer defensible in light of Supreme
Court decisions, including Price Waterhouse, that have clearly de-
fined the word "sex" to include sex- and gender-linked characteris-
tics within the scope of the term.269 The remaining question, then,
is whether sexual identity or gender identity is one of the gender-
linked characteristics properly included within the scope of the
word "sex."
In the absence of relevant legislative history as to the meaning
of the word "sex" in Title VII, there are a number of sources that
might be consulted in order to provide meaning to the term. One
source is the common societal meaning of the word, including defi-
nitions of "sex" set forth in dictionaries in use at the time of the en-
actment of the statute,27° which may have been the concept sought
to be captured by Congress in enacting the statute. Another source
267. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086. The court of appeals concluded that it was up to Congress
to protect transsexuals from discrimination "[i]f Congress believes that transsexuals
should enjoy the protection of Title VII," and that for the court to hold that Title VII
protects transsexuals "would take us out of the realm of interpreting and reviewing and
into the realm of legislating." Id. at 1086-87.
268. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
269. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
270. The Supreme Court has previously looked to dictionaries in determining the mean-
ing of race in interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the
unanimous Court looked to the definition of "race" in dictionaries from the nineteenth
century, because the statute was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Voting Rights Act of 1870, to determine the meaning of the term "race."
St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987).
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might be the meaning of the term as understood by medical profes-
sionals responsible for determining an individual's sex. Finally, one
might look to legal meanings of the term "sex" as included in Title VII,
for instance, by looking at how other similar terms and classifications
in Title VII have been interpreted.
Definitions of the word "sex" from dictionaries in use at or around
the time of the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
suggest a meaning of "sex" not restricted to biological sex. Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, pub-
lished in 1961, defines "sex" as a noun to include not only "one of the
two divisions of organic esp. human beings respectively designated
male or female" - which arguably means biological sex - but also
"the sum of the morphological, physiological, and behavioral pecu-
liarities of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction"-
which would seem to include aspects of sex that are not strictly bio-
logical, including behavioral aspects of sex.27' Similarly, Webster's
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, published in 1965, defines "sex"
as a noun to mean "either of two divisions of organisms distinguished
respectively as male or female," as well as "the sum of the structural,
functional, and behavioral peculiarities of living beings that subserve
reproduction by two interacting parents and distinguish males and
females."272 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language,
published in 1966, defines "sex" to include both "the fact or charac-
ter of being either male or female" and "the sum of the structural
and functional differences by which the male and female are distin-
guished, or the phenomena or behavior dependent on these differ-
ences." 273 Although it is true that the first meaning of the term in
each of these dictionaries is the one that suggests the "biological"
meaning, the second and broader meaning of the word "sex" is by no
means an unusual or uncommon meaning that would have been
271. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 2081 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1961). The word "transsexual" is not found in
the dictionary, but the word "transvestism" is defined to mean "the practice of adopting
the dress, the manner, and frequently the sexual role of the opposite sex." Id. at 2431. The
word "gender" is defined, in addition to its linguistic meaning, to mean "sex." Id. at 944.
272. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 795 (G. & C. MERRIAM CO.
1965). The word "gender" is defined to mean "sex," as well as its given linguistic meaning.
Id. at 347. The word "transsexual" is not found in the dictionary. Id. at 941-42. The word
"transvestism" is defined to mean "adoption of the dress and often behavior of the opposite
sex." Id. at 942.
273. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1307 (Jess Stein &
Lawrence Urdang, eds., Random House 1966). The second meaning of the term "gender"
is "sex"; the first meaning is the linguistic one. Id. at 589. The word "transsexual" is not
found in the dictionary, but the word "transvestism" is defined to mean "the practice of
wearing clothing appropriate to the opposite sex, often as a manifestation of homo-
sexuality." Id. at 1507.
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unknown to the members of the 1964 Congress. There is nothing
about these dictionary definitions that would suggest that gender-
related characteristics, including gender identity, are excluded from
this term. Instead, it would appear that gender identity would be one
of the behavioral or functional differences between the sexes referred
to in the broader versions of the definition of the word "sex."
Some courts have found this broader meaning of the word "sex"
to apply in interpreting statutes that, like Title VII, prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, suggesting that the meaning of the
term "sex" is not so plain. For example, in Enriquez v. West Jersey
Health Systems,274 the New Jersey Superior Court had to decide
whether the female transsexual plaintiff could state a claim of sex
discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(LAD)275 based on her claim that she was terminated because of her
external transformation from male to female.276 Although recogniz-
ing that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination had not
been interpreted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of transsex-
ualism,277 the court indicated that it disagreed with the rationale of
decisions finding that discrimination on the basis of transsexualism
is not discrimination on the basis of sex, finding them to use "too
constricted" a view of sex discrimination.27 The court reasoned:
A generation ago, when Justice Handler served in the
Appellate Division, he found that "[t]he evidence and authority
which we have examined, however, show that a person's sex
or sexuality embraces an individual's gender, that is, one's self-
image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual iden-
tity and character." We agree with Justice Handler that "sex" em-
braces an "individual's gender," and is broader than anatomical
sex. "[S] ex is comprised of more than a person's genitalia at birth."
The word "sex" as used in the LAD should be interpreted to in-
clude gender, protecting from discrimination on the basis of sex
or gender.279
The court, finding "incomprehensible" an interpretation of the stat-
ute that condones discrimination against men and women who seek
274. Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
275. Id. at 367. The prohibition of sex discrimination was added to the statute in 1970.
1970 N.J. Laws page no. 299 (effective June 2, 1970); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3
(West 1976). The common meaning of "sex" at that time, as reflected in dictionaries of
that period, appears to have been the same as when Title VII was enacted.
276. Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 367-68.
277. The court did note, however, that the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse "signaled a possible change in the federal approach to gender dysphoria."
Id. at 371.
278. Id. at 372.
279. Id. at 373 (citations omitted).
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to change their anatomical sex, concluded that "sex discrimination
under the LAD includes gender discrimination so as to protect [the]
plaintiff from gender stereotyping and discrimination for transform-
ing herself from a man to a woman."280
Another example of a court giving a broader interpretation to
the term "sex" can be found in the decision of the European Court of
Justice in the decision of P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council.28' In
that case, the court, lacking either a clear definition of the term "sex"
or relevant legislative history, had to decide whether article 2(1) of
European Union Council Directive 76/207/EEC, which provided that
"there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex," 212
should be interpreted to prohibit discrimination in employment on
the basis of transsexualism.2 3 The plaintiff was a transsexual woman
who was given notice of dismissal when she indicated that she in-
tended to undergo gender reassignment. 284 The court concluded that
the provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex "cannot
be confined simply to discrimination based on the fact that a person
is of one or the other sex" but instead applied to discrimination aris-
ing from the gender reassignment of the plaintiff.2"5 In reaching this
conclusion, the court apparently adopted the argument of the Advocate
General, who had reasoned as follows in his recommendation to the
court that discrimination on the basis of transsexualism be held to
be discrimination on the basis of "sex":
The objection is taken too much for granted, and has been raised
on several occasions in these proceedings that the factor of sex
discrimination is missing on the ground that 'female transsexuals'
are not treated differently from 'male transsexuals.' In short, both
are treated unfavourably, hence there can be no discrimination
at all....
I am not convinced by that view. It is quite true that even if P.
had been in the opposite situation, that is to say changing from
female to male, it is possible that she would have been dismissed
anyway. One fact, however, is not just possible, but is certain: P.
would not have been dismissed if she had remained a man.
So how can it be claimed that discrimination on grounds of sex
was not involved? How can it be denied that the cause of dis-
crimination was precisely, and solely, sex? To my mind, where
280. Id.
281. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & City of Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2159.
282. Council Directive 76/207, art. 2, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40.
283. See Case C-13/94 at 1-2164.
284. See id. at 1-2160.
285. See id. at 1-2165.
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unfavourable treatment of a transsexual is related to (or rather
is caused by) a change of sex, there is discrimination by reason of
sex or on grounds of sex, if that is preferred.2
The Advocate General also noted that discrimination against
women is generally not based on their physical characteristics but
the "image which society has of women." 287 The Advocate General in-
dicated that the same thing was generally true with respect to trans-
sexual individuals, suggesting the equivalence of discrimination on
the basis of transsexualism and sex discrimination against women.2s
He also indicated that denying the plaintiff protection against dis-
crimination because the discrimination was based on her change of
sex "would be a quibbling formalistic interpretation and a betrayal
of the true essence of that fundamental and inalienable value which
is equality." 29 Finally, the Advocate General argued that extending
protection to transsexualism as a form of sex discrimination was ap-
propriate because of "a universal fundamental value" that declares
sex irrelevant to employment, which would be violated if an employee
were allowed to be dismissed "because he or she changes from one of
the two sexes (whichever it may be) to the other by means of an oper-
ation which - according to current medical knowledge - is the only
remedy capable of bringing body and mind into harmony." 290
Medical and psychological research has confirmed that determin-
ing an individual's sex - whether he is a man or she is a woman -
is indeed more complex than the courts have generally recognized. It
is true, of course, that in most circumstances, the different compo-
nents that go into determining an individual's sex coincide, so that
the determination of sex is not controversial or disputed. Babies who
are "sexed" at birth by a study of external genitals generally also
have the "proper" chromosomes and internal sexual organs to cor-
respond to their assigned sex. But the existence of intersexed indi-
viduals, whose chromosomes, internal sex organs, and external sex
organs are not consistent with a uniform determination of male or
female, demonstrate that these physical components of sex can vary
among individuals.291 It appears that gender identity, or psychological
286. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, in P. v. S. & City of Cornwall County
Council, Case C-13/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143, available at http://eur-lex.europa.euLexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 61994C0013:EN:html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See generally, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Of Gender and Genitals: The Use and Abuse
of the Modern Intersexual, in SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCION
OF SEXUALITY 3, 3-77 (2000), for a discussion of determinates of the assignment of gender
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sex, may also vary from other components of determining sex. That
is, some individuals whose physical manifestations of sex would
suggest one gender instead self-identify as a member of the other
gender. One leading scholar of gender identity has indicated his
belief that transsexual and transgendered persons are "intersexed
in their brains."292
Studies of gender-role development suggest that children acquire
stereotypes about the roles of each gender at a very early age from a
variety of familial, social, and cultural influences and that a child's
gender identity - self-categorization as a boy or girl - is acquired
around age three.293 Other studies indicate that gender identity may
have a biological component and have demonstrated that the brain
components of transsexual persons are more similar to those whose
gender identity they share than those who have genitals like theirs.294
To the extent that gender identity is found to have a biological com-
ponent, it will be increasingly difficult for the courts to draw clear
distinctions between gender identity and "biological" sex.
The realities of sex discrimination in the context of employment
suggest that the legal definition of "sex" should be broader than
what is commonly thought of as biological sex. Although biological
sex might be thought to be determined by chromosomes, internal sex
organs, and external genitals, employers do not commonly engage
in discrimination on the basis of these characteristics. 295 Employers
do not generally require tests of or have access to information about
chromosomes before making employment decisions. 296 Nor do employ-
ers conduct examinations of internal or external genitalia before en-
- 21gaging in sex discrimination. 97Instead, employers make assumptions
at birth and the ways in which the chromosomes, internal sex organs, and external sex
organs of intersex individuals differ from the expected determinates of gender.
292. Diamond, supra note 176, at 597 n.14.
293. See Alexa A. Albert & Judith R. Porter, Children's Gender-Role Stereotypes: A
Sociological Investigation of Psychological Models, 3 Soc. F. 184, 186-90 (1988); see
generally Marsha Weinraub, et al., The Development of Sex Role Stereotypes in the Third
Year: Relationships to Gender Labeling, Gender Identity, Sex-typed Toy Preference, and
Family Characteristics, 55 CHILD DEv. 1493 (1984).
294. Diamond, supra note 176, at 593.
295. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding sex discrimi-
nation based on the employer's sex stereotype in stating that a female employee needed
"to take 'a course at charm school"'); Wilson v. S.W. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (rejecting Southwest Airlines' assertion that discrimination against males
was justified because of a bona fide occupation qualification requiring only females be
hired because of "sex appeal"). These types of claims do not hinge on the employer's aware-
ness of an employee's chromosomes or reproductive organs.
296. Cf. Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Feb. 9,2001),
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-9-01-c.html (stating that it is the Commission's "position
that basing employment decisions on genetic testing violates the ADA").
297. For a rare case, see Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29825, at *4, *10-12 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2004) (refusing to grant the employer's
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and decisions about sex based on an employee's gender presentation
or, perhaps, secondary sex characteristics. However, depending on
the progress of a transsexual individual's transitioning, the indi-
vidual may well have a gender presentation and secondary sex char-
acteristics consistent with his or her gender identity. And, as the
litigated cases show, employers generally take employment actions
against transsexual and transgendered individuals based on their
gender presentation or secondary sex characteristics, not based on
their chromosomes, internal sex organs, or genitals.29
Legal definitions of the word "sex" also suggest that a broader
interpretation of the term is the more appropriate one. Although the
term "sex" was not defined in Title VII at the time of its enactment,299
an amendment to this statute added a partial definition of "sex" that
suggests that it means something more than whether one is a man
or a woman. In the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,"0 Congress
added a definition of "sex" to the Act, providing that "because of
sex" includes but is not limited to "on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions."301 Although pregnancy clearly
has a biological component, the addition of this definition to Title VII
suggests that the statute was aimed at more than just protecting
men because they are men and women because they are women, in
that protection was also extended to pregnancy, a sex-linked charac-
teristic."2 Indeed, the employment discrimination against pregnant
women that the statute was intended to address is likely often based
on the societal and cultural expectations of pregnant women rather
than the physical aspects of pregnancy." 3
motion to dismiss plaintiffs Title VII sex discrimination claim based on a restroom use
policy). It is true that in Kastl an employer sought to justify its termination of a pre-
operative transsexual woman because of her refusal to use the men's restroom based
on the argument that its "restroom policy segregate[d] restroom use by genitalia" rather
than sex and that "a legitimate genitalia-based policy cannot constitute sex discrimi-
nation," but the employer apparently required only the plaintiff and one other trans-
sexual employee to provide proof as to the state of their genitals. See id. at *4, *11, *34.
298. See id. at *4, *7-8.
299. See Sheila Hatami & David Zwerin, Note, Educating the Masses: Expanding
Title VIIto Include Sexual Orientation in the Education Arena, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 311, 316 (2007) (discussing the lack of debate and legislative history regarding the
meaning of "because of sex" under Title VII).
300. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
301. Id.
302. See id.
303. For example, in House Report No. 95-948 on the bill that became the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, the Committee on Education and Labor indicated the following with
respect to the purpose of the bill:
As testimony received by this committee demonstrates, the assumption
that women will become pregnant and leave the labor force leads to the view
of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the discriminatory
practices which keep women in low-paying and dead end jobs. H.R. 6075
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Additional evidence of the meaning of "sei in Title VII, in partic-
ular as to whether the term should be interpreted to include gender-
related characteristics, including gender identity, can be gleaned
from the other categories of discrimination protection set forth in
the statute. Title VII, in addition to prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sex, also prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and
national origin,3 °4 classifications that might, like sex, be narrowly
interpreted to apply to only those who are identifiably part of the
classification as a matter of biology or historical fact. Accordingly,
one might ask whether these other classifications extend protection
to only a narrowly defined classification - whether one has a certain
level of "blood" of a particular race or a sufficient number of ancestors
from a particular country - or whether protection is also properly
extended by the statute to behaviors, expressions, and appearances
related to those classifications. That is, does Title VII's prohibition
against racial discrimination prohibit an employer from discriminat-
ing against an individual who identifies as a member of a particular
racial or ethnic group only if he or she can show a sufficient genetic
connection to that group, regardless of whether he or she self-identifies
and engages in practices associated with that group?0 5 Does Title VII's
unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes discrimination based
on pregnancy, and specifically defines standards which require that pregnant
workers be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability
or inability to work.
H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 (1978).
The House Report also made clear that the bill represented a clarification of Congress's
original intent as to the meaning of the term "sex" rather than a change in the meaning
of the statute. Id. at 4.
304. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis
of religion, but because religion is defined broadly in the statute to "include[ ] all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief," it might be argued that the
broader meaning of this term is statutorily required, unlike the term "sex." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j). It should be noted, however, that this definition, like the definition of sex to
include pregnancy and related conditions, was also added because of court decisions that
too narrowly interpreted the original provisions of the statute. See Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972); 118 CONG. REC. 705-731
(Jan. 21, 1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (proposing an amendment to add a defi-
nition of religion to Title VII in order to provide, through legislation, what was originally
intended by the Civil Rights Act but "clouded" by court decisions).
305. It is true that discrimination has been allowed on the basis of some types of
dress that might well be viewed as an aspect of racial identity, such as the wearing of
cornrows or dreadlocks. However, the "grooming code" cases - in which courts have
allowed employers to engage in a broad range of behavior that would appear to be dis-
criminatory in an analytical sense - are sufficiently different from other types of dis-
crimination cases that they should be regarded as sui generis, at least with respect to
conducting a proper analysis of the meaning of discrimination. See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild
Adventurers, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-H, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34119, at *4, *15 (M.D. Ga.
Apr. 25, 2008) (upholding an employer prohibition of dreadlocks and cornrows against
a challenge of racial discrimination because, even if hairstyles are worn predominately
by African Americans, "grooming policies are typically outside the scope of federal
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protection of national origin dictate that employment actions not be
based only on the country from which one comes but also on his or
her language and accent?
30 6
In Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities, °7 the district
court considered the argument of the employer that the plaintiff could
not make out a claim of racial discrimination based on his status as
a Native American because he was not in fact a Native American. °8
In support of this contention, the employer engaged in a study of
the plaintiffs genealogy in order to prove that he was not a Native
American." 9 The district court, in refusing to grant the employer's
motion for summary judgment, noted "that the issue of membership
in a given racial classification is deceptively complex."310 The district
court noted that "the Supreme Court [has] recognized the problematic
nature of racial categorization" and that many scientists "conclude
that racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather
than biological."31' The district court went on to find that the cate-
gorization of individuals into racial groups is largely a matter of per-
ception and self identification. The court refused to find that the
fact that the plaintiff may have had less than one-sixteenth Native
American blood meant that he was not Native American, in light of
his belief that he was Native American and his representation of
himself as Native American.312
employment discrimination statutes because they do not discriminate on the basis of
immutable characteristics").
306. Courts have generally held that discrimination based on a foreign accent is
discrimination on the basis of national origin, subject only to the bona fide occupational
qualification defense. See, e.g., Gold v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 487 F.3d 1001, 1008-09
(6th Cir. 2007) (stating comments about accent were direct evidence of national origin
discrimination because "'accent and national origin are inextricably intertwined.'");
Hasham v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that a comment that foreign accent cannot be understood supports inference
of national origin discrimination). And while the case law surrounding language discrimi-
nation is a little more ambiguous, compare Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270-71 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that while the ability to speak a language other than English might
be equated with national origin, a requirement that employees who can speak English
do so while on duty does not violate Title VII), with Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d
1294, 1301-09 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding evidence of a hostile work environment based
on an English-only rule), while the EEOC takes the position that English-only rules
implicate national origin discrimination because "[t]he primary language of an individual
is often an essential national origin characteristic." See Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2008).
307. Perkins v. Lake County Dep't of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
308. Id. at 1264.
309. See id. at 1266.
310. Id. at 1271.
311. Id. at 1272 (quoting St. Francis Coll. v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987)).
312. Id. at 1276-77. The court also noted the oddity of this case, in which the employer
went to great lengths to try to establish that the plaintiff was not a member of the racial
group in which he claimed membership. The court noted that "it is difficult to imagine
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Similarly, in Bennun v. Rutgers State University,313 the court
of appeals upheld the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff was
Hispanic and therefore could bring a claim of national origin dis-
crimination. 314 The employer had sought to rely on the fact that the
plaintiffs mother was born in Romania and his father in Israel in
contending that the plaintiff was not Hispanic. 15 The district court
had found the plaintiff to be Hispanic based not only on the fact that
his father was a Sephardic Jew who could trace his lineage to Jews
expelled from Spain during the Spanish Inquisition, but also the
fact that the plaintiff was born in Argentina, believed that he was
Hispanic, spoke Spanish in his home, and adopted Spanish culture
in his life.316 The court of appeals agreed with the district court's
conclusion, holding that this conclusion was supported by his "birth
in a Latin American country where Hispanic culture predominates,
his immersion in Spanish ways of life and the fact that he speaks
Spanish in the home." 317 Accordingly, the court gave weight not only
to historical facts and ancestry, but also to the plaintiff s identity as
a member of a particular national origin and possession of traits
associated with that national origin.318
That courts have been willing to extend protection to individuals
based on their racial identity or national origin identity under the
protected categories of "race" and "national origin" suggests that
one's sexual or gender identity should be subject to protection under
the category of "sex." These comparisons are not tricks of semantics.
Sexual or gender identity is not fundamentally different from racial
identity and national origin identity, other than the fact that we
have created new words and categories of persons to describe per-
sons with a gender identity incongruent with their biological sex -
"transsexual" or "transgendered" - while no such word or concept
can be clearly articulated with respect to the other classifications.
an employer challenging an employee's status as an African-American and requiring
proof of ancestry in a Title VII case in which a black Plaintiff alleged employment
discrimination." Id. at 1278 n.20.
313. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1991).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 171.
316. Id. at 172-73.
317. Id. at 171-73.
318. See id.; see also Eriksen v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., No. 06-13549, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23909, at *17, *28 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007) (concluding that the plaintiff had
shown sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether she was a Native
American for purposes of her claims of national origin discrimination under a state anti-
discrimination statute, which, like Title VII, does not contain a definition of "national
origin," and relying on the fact that the plaintiff represented herself as a Native American,
participated in Native American social and ceremonial events, and testified as to her belief
about her Native American ancestry).
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We do not have a readily available word to describe someone whose
racial identity is not congruent with their "real" race because we
have not generally felt a need to classify those persons - although
in less enlightened times, society followed the "one drop of blood" rule
and imposed sanctions on minorities who tried to "pass" as white.319
Members of a particular national origin who do not conform to their
expected language and customs are not subject to sanction because
as a society we tolerate and value - and sometimes even force -
assimilation.32 °
But gender identity has been treated differently because sex and
gender classifications continue to be rigid in our society and failure
to comply with the expectations associated with those categories
causes discomfort and anger. The more gender nonconforming the
behavior, the more discomfort and anger that is created. But these
societal realities do not justify providing less protection to gender non-
conformists than to individuals who fail to conform to the societal ex-
pectations of other protected classifications. After all, Title VII was
enacted at least in part to counteract the prejudices of society toward
individuals because of traits associated with these protected classi-
fications, so the prejudices that society holds toward gender noncon-
formists - including transsexual and transgendered individuals -
should not be a justification for denying them protection against what
is, at its essence, discrimination on the basis of sex.
CONCLUSION
Sexual minorities, including transsexual and transgendered
individuals, have continued to fall largely outside of the protections
of the workplace discrimination statutes at a federal level and in a
majority of states. But the structure necessary to provide such pro-
tection is already in place. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and virtually all state statutes prohibit discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of sex. As demonstrated in this Article, the term
319. See generally the discussion of the implications of the "one drop" rule, which
classified individuals as black with as little as one drop of "black blood," originally as
a way to expand the slave population to include slaveholders' children with their slaves
and later as a way to keep the white race "pure," in Lawrence Wright, One Drop of
Blood, NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 46.
320. See Juan F. Perea, Buscando Amrica: Why Integration and Equal Protection
Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1420, 1426-33 (2004) (discussing the history
of forced assimilation of Latinos through attempts to eliminate use of Spanish in schools
and in the workplace); see also Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 876-96 (2002)
(discussing "assimilationist bias" with respect to race and language and tendency of this
bias to force groups protected by anti-discrimination statutes to engage in compulsory
assimilation).
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"sex" should be defined more broadly than courts have seen fit to
do with respect to sexual minorities, because the term has been de-
fined quite broadly, in other contexts, to extend protection not only
based on biological characteristics but also on the basis of gender-
linked traits. Gender identity - or psychological gender - would
appear to be a classic gender-linked trait and therefore the essence
of what should be provided protection by the prohibition against sex
discrimination. Indeed, even if sex discrimination were to be narrowly
defined to mean discrimination against men because they are men
and women because they are women, it would appear that discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender identity - the innate sense of whether
one is a man or one is a woman - would be prohibited discrimination
on the basis of sex.
